



**Draft**

Comments most welcome

**3<sup>rd</sup> Conference of the European Union Studies Association-Asia Pacific**

**Keio University, Tokyo**

8<sup>th</sup> – 10<sup>th</sup> December 2005

**CENTRALITY, INCLUSIVENESS AND COHESIVENESS:  
EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE AND... PERSPECTIVES ON THE EAST  
ASIAN SUMMIT<sup>1</sup>**

**David Camroux**  
CERI / Sciences Po

**Introduction**

My paper is divided into three sections in which I deal with three questions that are, in my view, at the heart of debates on regional integration in Europe and in East Asia, namely that of centrality within a regional structure, inclusion or exclusion within a regional club and, finally, questions of cohesiveness, i.e. the formulation and acceptance of club rules, or club norms. The three concepts are interlinked and I shall devote most of my attention to the first with lesser attention to the two others. However prior to developing these points I have chosen to make some comments on the literature on regional integration in Asia.



**SCIENCES PO**



The study of regional construction in Asia has developed apace since the 1990s linked to the rise of what has been described – not totally convincingly - as the new regionalism (Hettne 2003). This broadening literature is increasingly sophisticated involving authors from a number of disciplines and with differing perspectives (Higgott & Breslin 2000, Liu & Regnier, 2002, Pempel 2005). Nevertheless in my view the literature in general suffers to varying degrees from a lack of clarity of vocabulary: the terms “regionalism” and “regionalization” are often used interchangeably in describing the construction of regional entities in Asia.

While the most comprehensive recent edited volumes on regional construction (Breslin et al 2002, Pempel 2005) and perhaps the most stimulating recent article (Kim 2004) do make attempts to provide clearer conceptual distinctions these distinctions, require still greater refining. In my view T.J. Pempel (2005) does not provide us with a helpful template when he defines regionalism as “a top-down process of government to government formation of institutions such as ASEAN, APEC or the ASEAN regional Forum (ARF) and regionalization as the bottom-up process of cross-border cooperation driven primarily by non-governmental actors such as corporations, NGOs and track II groups” (Pempel 2005:6) The appropriate emphasis on the state/non-state actor dichotomy as the defining element of differentiation between the two concepts seems to be a peculiarly American preoccupation. European experience of regional construction would insist on the fluidity of relations and initiatives in actions in regional construction between State and non-State actors, a fluidity born out in most studies of Asian regional integration. Rather than using the importance of governmental action as the lodestone for differentiating between “regionalism” and “regionalization” I would suggest a distinction between the ideational and process. In this regard Samuel Kim’s definition of regionalism as, like globalism, “a normative concept referring to shared values, norms, identity and aspirations” (Kim 2004: 40) seems much more helpful. In other words my suggestion would be to define “regionalism” as like many other “isms” (socialism, communism, fascism, etc) as being essentially ideational implying degrees of identity and the construction thereof. Like nations, regions are also imagined communities, to use Benedict Anderson’s felicitous phrase (Anderson 1991)

Despite his useful reconceptualization of “regionalism” Kim leads us, in my view, along the same misguided path as T.J. Pempel when immediately afterwards he refers to “regionalism’ as referring to “State led projects of cooperation” (Kim 2005: 40) Nevertheless he goes part of the way in providing us with a helpful definition of “regionalization” which he describes as “akin to globalization, refer(ing) to non-state driven – usually market driven – processes of integration.” In insisting on process, this definition does provide greater clarity but the emphasis on the non-state driven aspect is misleading. As the literature in

international political economy suggests, in Asia states have been heavily involved in processes of integration precisely through their intervention in markets (see for example Katzesntein et al 2000). Moreover lack of state capacity can impact on these processes of regionalization (Hamilton-Hart 2003). Finally, given that a cursory examination of numerous two-track actors in East Asia reveals that many of these NGOs (non-governmental organisations) are in reality GONGOs (ie government organized, or at least oriented, non-governmental organizations) then, it could be asked, is the State / non-State distinction helpful?

Be this as it may, the state/non state distinction needs to be acknowledged and incorporated in to our analytical grids, even if, as I have suggested, we remove it is the defining element in differentiating “regionalism” and “regionalization”. It is perhaps by factoring in the distinction within the types of processes of regionalization that we can give it its true heuristic value. Richard Higgott’s (1997) earlier distinction between de facto economic regionalization and de juré institutional regionalization provides us with a template in which the State-non-State distinction becomes salient. Of course the de juré / de facto description refers to ideal types and in practice regional constructions involve various doses of both forms. Moreover, in a process-based definition the interactions between governmental and non-governmental actors can be given its full attention.

In my view “regionalism” is in relation to “regionalization” at the meso level (Gamble & Payne 1996) of international relations what “nationalism” is in relation to “nation-building” at the micro level. To complement our “de jure institutionalised regionalisation” and “de facto economic regionalisation” template I would suggest positing a second dichotomy of ideal types: state led alter-national regional identity construction and civil society led transnational regional identity building. Once again, as with the templates for regionalisation, neither of these phenomena exist in a pure form and regional experience generally would indicate a mixture of the two.

Furthermore, as with nationalism and stato-national constructions, there are “inter-retro-reactions” between process and ideational/identity developments with, in practice, each feeding off the other. Above all State actors are not the only custodians and vectors of ideas of regional identity. On the contrary, as the following analysis will attempt to demonstrate the idea of an Asian community or Asian region has been the handiwork also of public intellectuals and epistemic communities within civil society over the last century and a half. Moreover, in much of the discourse conceptualizing, appropriating and vaunting the idea of Asia, regional processes of economic development and economic integration are reinterpreted as an ideological plus. As a number of studies of Asianism and the Asian values debate suggest the bottom line concerns the success of the process of economic

growth and economic integration as underpinning claims to regional specificity. (See for example Domenach 1997).

### **Centrality**

The question of centrality has two aspects: centrality WITHIN a regional grouping, and the centrality of that grouping in an international context involving other players, in some cases also of a regional kind. Let me take as an example of the former the recent debate on the European constitution. Much ink has flowed – and many megabytes of electronic data sent through cyberspace – to examine the reasons for the No vote during the referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty held in France at the end of last May. While most analysts point to domestic factors: unhappiness with the socio-economic situation and disenchantment with an increasingly unpopular government and president, specifically European issues were at stake. A number of commentators have pointed to the disparity between the strength of the no votes and opinion polls which still demonstrate an overwhelming attachment to the idea of Europe and of continuing European construction. As I shall argue later, the no vote represented a disapproval of enlargement, both that realized and that to come. However at this point what I wish to suggest is that the no vote in France demonstrates a realization that France is no longer central in Europe. Since de Gaulle the European project has been presented in a sense as France writ large, a fulfilment of the Napoleonic dream achieved peacefully. For decades the Franco-German axis reinforced this impression of centrality. However the entry in 2004 of ten member countries – the biggest enlargement exercise in the history of the EU – has changed the fundamental balances within Europe. In a sense Mitteleuropa, Central and Eastern Europe, has refound its historic place, a place temporarily frozen during the Cold War. Arithmetically both in demographic terms, in terms of votes in the European Parliament and in terms of its weight in the Council of the European Union, France, like Britain and Germany weighs less. The Franco-German axis finds itself competing with other ad hoc coalitions for example, that between Britain and Poland and/or Hungary. Let me say these appreciations are not based on my analysis as a political scientist but as a minor activist for the Yes vote in France which has led me to the conclusion that France, is no longer central in Europe, it is merely essential.

Turning to this part of the world, centrality one would expect should be an issue within countries in East Asia and particularly within its most institutionalised sub-region, ASEAN. Given the demographic and economic weight of Indonesia, for example, one would expect an Indonesian willingness to impose a Jakarta leadership option. One of the intriguing questions, and one left unanswered is why this has not occurred. It is a question well beyond

the scope of this discussion.

Centrality for ASEAN within East Asia, as for the European Union, is an issue in relation to my second interpretation: that of its relationship with other regional organizations. To deal with Europe first, the question of centrality is essentially a Transatlantic one and concerns the United States and... Asia. Words do mean something and an obsession with multi-polarity by some of the more-enlightened political leaders in Europe is a way of carving out a central place for Europe in relationship with the only hyper-power in the global system. However centrality in this context implies cohesion – a point to which I shall return in my last section – for it is only by “pooling sovereignty”, to use some Euro-speak, can Europe, as the European Union, speak with one voice and therefore, in soft power terms at least, be a central pole in a multi-polar world. This is notably the case in the area of trade where negotiations for the European member states are delegated to the European Trade Commissioner. In practice what occurs is a “three level game” with negotiations occurring at three “tables” at the same time: the international, the intra-European and the domestic.

I am one of the optimists who believe that a common security and defence policy for Europe is being built notwithstanding the cleavages within the EU over Iraq. Nevertheless it would be misguided to dismiss the Transatlantic preferences of not only Britain, but also many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. From the perspective of the leadership of those countries it was the unutilized hard power of the US and NATO that indirectly brought about the fall of Communism and the end of the Soviet Empire, and not the well intentioned mumblings of Western European leaders and the soft-power of the EU. This interpretation is somewhat unfair for it is the attractiveness of the EU as the guarantor of peace, stability and prosperity that made the political transitions in these countries relatively benign.

Turning to ASEAN the question of centrality in relation to immediate neighbourhood and across the Pacific is a millennial predicament. Put prosaically, does being a crossroads, to use Denys Lombard’s felicitous phrase for Java, constitute being central? Historically the tributary and suzerainty relationships with China of the Southeast Asian states in the pre-colonial period were very complex indeed and were certainly did not involve the degree of subservience sometimes claimed. Today the “Peaceful rise of China”, to use the official formulation of the Chinese leadership, poses a challenge for ASEAN.

Time does not allow me to deal with the broad sweep of Asian regionalism since the mid nineteenth century, where I feel we must at least begin. Let me merely concentrate on the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998 which both coincided with, and impacted upon, fundamental long terms developments in the Asia-Pacific region. On a fundamental level it laid to bear some of the hype on the Asian economic miracle while accentuating shifting

balances between Southeast and Northeast Asia. The crisis revealed the weakness of the so-called ASEAN way based on consensus on the lowest common denominator and the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other member states. There was no pan-ASEAN response to the crisis and the political elites of Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia all chose different paths to get their economies in order. Since the crisis the combined effects of uncontrolled burning and the ensuing pollution and environmental degradation, transnational terrorism and other soft security questions (such as piracy) have all contributed to calling into question ASEAN's institutionally weak form of intergovernmental regionalism.

In this context, political and business elites in Southeast Asia have ostensibly chosen two complimentary agenda. On the one hand, to concentrate on developing ASEAN as a free trade area pursuant to the AFTA agreement of 1992. On the other hand, to try to maintain ASEAN as the "centre" around which an East Asian community can be built. Behind both objectives lies a concern to deal with the rise of China as a major economic and political actor. In my view while certain economic sectors may have suffered from a shift in FDI and production from Southeast Asia to China, overall China's rapid economic growth has benefited Southeast Asian countries. This being said there is a strong perception that a north-side divide is opening up between Southeast and Northeast Asia which requires remedial action to ensure that Southeast Asia remains central to the regionalization process (Lim & Lee 2004). Nevertheless, ASEAN leaders are seeking to tie China into more predictable economic relations through the signing of a Free Trade Agreement. In quite a realist strategy they are also seeking to balance Chinese influence and power through the signing of a similar agreement with Japan and through developed links with South Korea. In a sense what is sought is a reformulation of Dr Mahathir's proposal for an East Asian Economic Group, but with ASEAN as its core (Hund 2003, Terada 2003). Nomenclatures count and the expression "ASEAN + 3" seeks to emphasize ASEAN's centrality despite, or rather because of the, yawning economic and political disparities with its northern neighbours. A similar concern can be found in the name of the only Asia-Pacific forum concerned with security questions, the ASEAN Regional Forum. This forum goes beyond East Asia involving also the United States and India as well as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Russia and the European Union.

In the lead up to the East Asian Summit to be held in Kuala Lumpur next month I suspect that we are seeing an attempt by the ASEAN countries to "kill two birds with one stone", namely to assure China's engagement in terms acceptable to the neighbourhood and secondly to ensure ASEAN's centrality by broadening the grouping to include Australia and New Zealand and above all India. The most important of these new entrants is India whose re-entry into the Asian cosmos evokes three types of commentary. The first involves the

significant ideological support of the Japanese policy community for this engagement, a support commensurate with the degree of Japanese FDI in India. Korean involvement is more difficult to measure even though Korea has become a major investor in India. Secondly, India has benefited from the support of two Southeast Asian 'godfathers', Thailand and Singapore. It was after all the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra who in 2001 initiated yet another informal sub-regional economic grouping, BIMSTEC, involving the Bay of Bengal countries, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar (Burma), Sri Lanka and Thailand. The Singaporean government was previously instrumental in organizing the first conferences of overseas Indians, through significant FDI within India, and through the support provided by Singaporean think tanks in promoting India's Asian credentials (eg Kumar 2004).

Such new-found support for the inclusion of India within East Asia is neither fortuitous nor disinterested. On one level, it reflects modifications in the regionalization processes where India is now factored in. On the level of regionalism, the ideational definition of Asia, it reflects, in my view, a desire in realpolitik terms to find a weighty ally around the table faced with a formidable China. Furthermore, "playing the India card" (Richardson 2002) within an Asian community allows the leadership of the two most pro-American countries in Southeast Asia, as well as the two anchors of the US alliance system, Australia and Japan, to echo a policy concern in Washington. In other words membership of India (like that of Australia and New Zealand) within a putative Asian Community has the indirect spin-off of reassuring the Bush Administration – and the US policy community - that this new "Concert of Asia" would not be inimical to US interests (Khoo).

The choice of broadening rather than deepening in regional construction echoes developments in Europe where British governments, for example, have been the strongest proponents of continual enlargement, including to Turkey, an enlargement presented very much in realpolitik terms. Since the last enlargement Britain has indeed become more central in European construction while France and Germany, as I have suggested, have lost something of their central role. Further enlargement would appear to be even more conducive to the Blairite vision of Europe.

### **Inclusiveness**

During the referenda debates in France and The Netherlands and in debates, for example during the recent German elections - two questions, unrelated to the constitution itself were also raised: that of the inclusion of the ten new members, ie enlargement, on which public approval had never been sought; and that of the exclusion of new candidate countries namely Turkey. In dealing with questions of inclusion and exclusion other factors come into play. Turkey's religious exceptionalism as a Muslim country is instrumentalized

both as an argument for its exclusion (ie Turkey does not share Europe's Christian tradition) and for inclusion (ie we must demonstrate particularly to Muslim minorities that Europe is a broad church capable of absorbing all irrespective of religious affiliation).

The question of culture was also important in the arguments used say by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed to argue for Australia and New Zealand's exclusions from his East Asian Grouping. The change of position of his successor Abdullah Badawi on this subject is not merely a question of change of personality, nor does it seem to indicate that the peoples of the Antipodes have made a rapid cultural transformation. What it does indicate is, what we knew all along, that communities are social constructions and like nations they define themselves first of all by excluding and only then including. In simple terms, the China of the early part of this century – like the United States of this period – is a somewhat different neighbour to cope with than the china of the latter part of the last. Opening the doors into the community to those with shared interests is an appropriate way of dealing with such a neighbour.

India, like Australia, was perceived as a “liminal” state in the years of rapid economic development in Asia. During the period of the Cold War, successive Indian governments did not choose the export-oriented developmental model of East Asia, but rather chose a model of import substitution. Moreover border tensions with China, an alliance with the Soviet Union and estrangement from all Southeast Asian countries except Vietnam meant that the greater Asia of Bandung was put within parenthesis (Jaffrelot 2003). A balance of payments crisis in 1991 persuaded the then Indian Finance Minister, and present Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh to liberalize the economy under IMF guidance. East Asia was to be seen both as a source of investment and as providing a model for rapid economic development. India's “look east” policy, like that of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir in the 1980s sought to bring together both process and ideology. Successive Indian governments embarked on a serious diplomatic offensive, that saw India admitted as a dialogue partner with ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN regional forum. Accompanied by these diplomatic efforts, India was able to attract significant investment not only from Japan and Korea, who extended a practice of delocalized production already initiated elsewhere in Asia, but also from Malaysia and Singapore both of whom possess significant minority Indian populations. The culmination of these initiatives, changing economic models and trade flows was that by 2003 Indian politicians and members of the policy community were reclaiming India's “historic birthright” as a member of the Asian Community (Kumar 2004). While there was an underlying rhetoric of cultural affinity in this pleading, it was above all the positive economic advantages of Indian membership that are stressed (Asher and Sen 2005).

## **Cohesiveness**

The debates surrounding the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union – at least in the self-serving rhetoric of politicians on the right and left – ostensibly saw a contest between two models of Europe: a liberal free market outward-looking Europe and the European social model of a strong welfare state with government interventionism. To simplify the former sees Europe more in terms of an economic community, while the latter would stress the role of Europe as a political entity. In point of fact in my experience not so much as a political scientist but as grassroots political actor, views on the European project transcend the traditional left-right cleavages. In point of fact the underlying question concerns national sovereignty and the degree to which it seems either necessary or, for some, desirable to abandon such sovereignty to larger supra-national entities. There were already tensions in a fifteen member European Union on these questions but enlargement has exacerbated them.

ASEAN's internal coherence has also been sorely tested by its own enlargement to include Vietnam, in 1995, then of Burma/Myanmar and Laos in 1997 and finally of Cambodia in 1998. Seen from outside Southeast Asia, the inability of the peer pressure of other member countries to bring about even modest political change in Burma is but one manifestation of internal weakness. Moreover the limited solidarity of the ASEAN club has been demonstrated by bilateral FTAs signed between Singapore and the US and Australia and between Thailand and Australia. ASEAN may well be the only regional structure with a degree of institutionalisation but its own institutional regionalisation may find itself overtaken by other processes that reflect more fully the underlying economic processes at play. Moreover, since its enlargement to include authoritarian states as Vietnam, Laos, Burma/Myanmar and Cambodia, ASEAN's cohesiveness around a semi-democratic model of governance has been dissipated.

Within the de facto economic regionalization processes at play, there are tendencies working, if not for the marginalisation of Southeast Asian countries, at least to greater dependence on the “+3” of Northeast Asia. These changing balances are reflected, in my view, in new conceptualisations within the domain of Asian regionalism. At its annual summit in November 2001, the ASEAN +3 accepted the proposal of then Korean President Kim Dae Jung for an East Asian Vision Group (2002) comprising academics from the participating countries. A successor group involving officials from the same countries, the East Asian Study Group (2002), was also established to scrutinize the report of the former and, in practice to water down some of the proposals of the former. In fact the watering down involved essentially questions of pace: the study group putting into medium term objectives certain proposals which had been proposed as short term by the Vision group. The desirability, even

inevitability, of an East Asian Community was strongly vaunted in both reports. Given the weight of ASEAN membership in both expert groups, it could be argued that ASEAN +3 has already been discarded by policy making communities within ASEAN itself. Such a development warrants our attention. Japanese involvement continues unabated with for example the setting up of a Council on (an) East Asian Community in May 2004 involving participants from twelve major Japanese think tanks, fourteen of the largest Japanese corporations and 63 individual members from academia, the media and the public service. Chaired by Nakasone Yasuhiro, the former Japanese Prime Minister and architect in the 1980s of Japan's most aggressive diplomatic forays in Asia. Two elements within this policy paper, elements confirmed by the praxis of the Koizumi government, are of salience to this analysis. The first, related to regionalization processes, concerns the "principles of openness, transparency and inclusion" in defining the limits of an Asian community. The second, on the level of regionalism, proposes that "a soft regional identity should be promoted in East Asia based on the recognition that the common characteristic of various cultures in East Asia is its hybrid composition of local, traditional and modern cultures with the increasing common influence of a common urban culture in East Asia". The policy report then continues in a direct rebuttal of a Mahathirian concept of Asia by suggesting that "the development of an identity focused primarily on differences with other regions would not be desirable". (Council on East Asian Community 2005: 7).

What can be read between the lines in these recommendations? In my view the Japanese government is confronted by a similar dilemma to that of the other anchor of the US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific, namely Australia (Michael Richardson 2005), as to how to reconcile their participation in the two concentric circles of regional construction (to use the conventional jargon) in the Asia-Pacific, namely the intra-East Asian and the extra-East Asian, across the Pacific. Put more prosaically, this involves assuring themselves of the existing and cost-effective protection of the United States, while advancing their economic and political interests with their neighbours. This is not to suggest that somehow the political leaderships of these countries have "sold out" to the United States (Berkofsky 2005), it is merely to suggest that the United States remains the guarantor of last resort of security in the region one whose importance can be more or less acknowledged depending on domestic factors within individual nation states. It would seem to this writer that for the Japanese leadership the way of reconciling these seemingly contradictory demands is to ensure the enlargement of a putative Asian community not only to include Australia (its objective partner prior to and since the creation of APEC) and New Zealand but, more importantly India. Indeed "playing the India card" in relation to China fits rather conveniently into previous recommendations of the US policy community close to the State Department (Lloyd

Richardson 2002) and since then the thrust of US foreign policy in the second Bush administration.

The second and certainly most significant development involves the “peaceful rise of China” to use the expression of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. The doctrine of China’s peaceful rise (*heping jueqi*) developed from a new security concept elaborated a number of Chinese think tanks in the mid-1990s; Many of these think tanks were already involved in cooperative activities with similar security-oriented think tanks in Asia and elsewhere. Emphasis is placed in the doctrine on soft power means of promoting China’s national interest. In particular through multilateral and regional cooperation and the development thus of good neighbourly relations, China can best enhance its own internal development. Since its enunciation the term “peaceful rise” has been modified in a way to embrace all of Asia (Suettinger 2005) and while it is less frequently used the essence of the doctrine remains. Chinese willingness to engage in constructive dialogues with neighbouring partners has undoubtedly both quickened since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and represents, at the meso or regional level, the normalization of China as an international actor at the macro or international/multilateral level as symbolized by Chinese entry into the WTO.

## **Conclusions**

What lessons, if any, can be drawn from the European and East Asian experiences of enlargement? I would suggest there are three. First of all that regional groupings are not static, regionalization is like riding on a bicycle, if you stop peddling you fall off. More pointedly the contours of a regional group are fluid and it is this fluidity and, above all, the capacity to make it acceptable to those already in the club which is the salient factor. Secondly, external adversaries and external challenges are crucial in the consolidation of regional groups and in developing solidarity and cohesion. Finally institutionalisation is essential, in order to overcome periods of difficulties and disenchantment. While institutionalisation requires political will and considerable investment, yet it has the advantage of locking in the club members and significantly increasing the price of defection. It is much, much and much too early to make any prognostics on membership in the “East Asian Club”, let alone membership requirements and membership dues; nevertheless I trust this paper has at least the modest merit of indicating the observables, worthy of observation.

## References

- Asher, Mukul & Sen, Rahul (2005), "India-East Asia Integration: A Win-Win for Asia", *RIS Discussion Papers*, 91#2005 ([www.ris.org.in](http://www.ris.org.in))
- Badawi Abdullah (2004) "Towards an Integrated East Asia Community", Speech at a meeting organized by the Boao Forum for Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 6<sup>th</sup> December ([domino.kln.gov.my](http://domino.kln.gov.my))
- (2005) "Statement at the Boao Forum for Asia", Hainan 23<sup>rd</sup> April.
- Berkofsky, Axel (2005), "China's Asian Ambitions", *Far Eastern Economic Review* June
- Council on East Asian Community (2005), *The State of the Concept of (an) East Asian Community and Japan's Strategic Response thereto*, August ([www.ceac.jp](http://www.ceac.jp))
- Breslin, Shaun, Hughes, Christopher, Phillips, Nicola & Rosamond, Ben (eds) (2002), *New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy*, London: Routledge.
- Domenach, Jean-Luc (1997) "L'asiatisme, une idéologie pour l'Asie" in David Camroux & Jean-Luc Domenach (eds), *L'Asie retrouvée?*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, pp. 17-52.
- East Asia Study Group (2002) *Final Report of the East Asia Study Group*. ASEAN+3 Summit, 4 November ([www.aseansec.org](http://www.aseansec.org))
- East Asian Vision Group (2001), *Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress*. ([www.aseansec.org](http://www.aseansec.org))
- Goh Chok Tong (2004), "Asia – Catalyst for global integration", *Asia Europe Journal* 2 (1): 1-5.
- Hettne, Bjorn (2003), "The New Regionalism Revisited" in Fredrik Söderbaum & Timothy Shaw (eds) *Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Higgott, Richard (1997) "De Facto or de Juré Regionalism: the Double Discourse of Regionalization in the Asia-Pacific", *Global Security* 11 (2): 65-83.
- & Breslin, Shaun (2000), "Studying Region: Learning from the Old, Constructing the New" *New Political Economy*, 5 (3): 333-352.
- Howard, John (2005) "Transcript of the Address to the Boao Forum, China" , 23<sup>rd</sup> April. ([www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches](http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches))
- Hu Jintao (2004) "China's Development is an Opportunity for Asia", Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia 2004 Annual Conference 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2004. ([www.chinaembassy.org.au](http://www.chinaembassy.org.au)).
- Hund, Markus (2003), "ASEAN Plus Three: towards a new age of pan-East Asian regionalism? A skeptic's appraisal", *The Pacific Review* 16 (3): 383-418.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe (2003), "India's look east policy: an Asianist strategy in perspective", *India Review* 2 (2): 35-68.
- Japanese Committee on Outlook for a New Asia (1994), *Outlook for a New Asia and Japan's Response*, Kuala Lumpur, ISIS.

- Khoo, Nicholas & Smith, Michael (2001), "A Concert of Asia"?, *Policy Review* 108. ([www.policyreview.org](http://www.policyreview.org))
- Kim, Samuel (2004), "Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia", *Journal of East Asian Studies* 4 (1): 39-67.
- Kumar, Nagesh (2004) "A Vision of an Asian Economic Community" in Nagesh Kumar (ed.), *Towards an Asian Economic Community: Vision of a New Asia*, New Delhi: RIS / Singapore: ISEAS: pp. 1-12.
- Lim, Hank & Lee Chyungly (eds) (2004), *The Emerging North-South Divide in East Asia: a Reappraisal of Asian Regionalism*, Singapore: Eastern Universities Press.
- Lim Kian Tick (2001), "Competing regionalism: APEC and EAEG, 1989-1990 in Andrew Tan & J.D Kenneth Boutin (eds) *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Select Publishing.
- Pempel, T.J. (ed.) (2005), *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 256-275.
- Ravenhill, John (2001), *APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Richardson, Lloyd (2002), "Now, Play the India Card", *Policy Review*, October ([www.policyreview.org](http://www.policyreview.org))
- Richardson, Michael (2005), "Australia-Southeast Asia Relations and the East Asian Summit", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59 (3): 351-365
- Shambaugh, David (2004/05), "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order", *International Security* 29 (3): 64-99
- Shanker, Vincenta (2004) "Towards an Asian Economic Community: Exploring the Past" in Nagesh Kumar (ed.), *Towards an Asian Economic Community: Vision of a New Asia*, New Delhi: RIS / Singapore: ISEAS: pp. 13-40.
- Shiraishi Takashi (2005), "East Asian Community Won't Hurt US Interests", *The Daily Yomiuri*, 5<sup>th</sup> September
- Soesastro, Hadi (2004) "Building an East Asian Community through Trade and Investment Integration", *CSIS Working Paper Series* (67), ([www.csis.or.id/papers/wpe067](http://www.csis.or.id/papers/wpe067))
- Sopiee, Nordin (2004), "The Making of an East Asian Community: Strategic Challenges, Strategic Responses". Unpublished speech, Tokyo 3-4 February.
- Staff of *The Cambodia Daily* (2003), *A Vision for a New Asia: 7 Asian Leaders speak on Economics, Trade and Terrorism*, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications.
- Suettinger, Robert (2005), "The Rise and Descent of 'Peaceful Rise'", *China Leadership Monitor*, N°12.
- Terada, Takashi (2003), "Constructing an 'East Asian' concept and growing regional

identity: from EAEC to ASEAN+3” *The Pacific Review* 16 (2): 251-277.

Wesley, Michael (1997), “The politics of exclusion: Australia, Turkey and definitions of regionalism” *The Pacific Review* 10 (4): 523-555

---

<sup>1</sup> An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 7th EU-East Asian Think Tank Dialogue, Singapore 21st-23rd November 2005.