SGDN SECRETARIAT GENERAL DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
CERI CENTRE D'ETUDES ET DE RECHERCHES INTERNATIONALES

PRODUCTION DE DROGUE ET STABILITE DES ETATS

DRUG PRODUCTION AND STATE STABILITY

Report

Policy Brief

Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy and Laurent Laniel

December 2006

Perceptions of security shared by our states have widened to take into account less traditional threats such as terrorism, arms proliferation, and trafficking in human beings and illegal goods, including drugs. Agricultural drug production is the source of significant but illegal resources for very fragile rural peoples, as well as a threat to the security of those countries to which the drugs are exported. The local impact of agricultural drug production is less well understood, at least in France. Although important from the point of view of the security of a number of states - even of whole regions, as in Latin America – the subject belongs partly to the field of security studies and partly to that of development studies, and has therefore not been much examined in its own right.

It was in order to address this complex issue from all angles that the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI – Centre for international research and studies) and Sciences-Po's Centre pour la Paix et la Sécurité Humaine (CPSH – Centre for peace and human security) organised a seminar on 'Drug production and state stability', held in Paris on 6 October 2005, with the financial support of the Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale (SGDN – Office of the Secretary General for National Defence). Bringing together researchers, field workers and major players, the goal of the event was to take a global overview of the subject, along with an analytical look at the measures implemented by the international community in order to fight against drugs.

The SGDN, from which the idea for the seminar first came, is one of the Prime Minister's departments, and is active where issues regarding the internal and external security of France converge. An inter-ministerial office, the SGDN prioritises reflection upon, preparation for, decision-making on, and follow-up of such issues. It coordinates and oversees teams put together to address specific questions, with the aid of ministries concerned. The CERI, one of whose objectives is to make expert assessments of international problems, in particular in the field of security, decided to organise this collective exchange of ideas on the effect of agricultural drug production upon state security in collaboration with the CPSH. This new centre for thematic research, set up by Sciences-Po, is based upon an interdisciplinary pedagogical approach. Its aim is to produce articles and publications on the broadening of security doctrines and paradigms. The PRODIG laboratory of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS – National centre for scientific research) and the Institut

National des Hautes Etudes de Sécurité (INHES – National institute for advanced security studies) also associated themselves with the event through participation of two of their researchers.

We are pleased to present the results of this collaborative effort, the second since 2004[1].

Christophe Jaffrelot	Eric Lebédel	Sharbanou Tadjbakhsh
CERI	SGDN	CPSH

[1] An initial collaboration between the SGDN and the CERI led to a seminar being held in June 2004, entitled 'today's old soldiers – demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration' and to the publication of a report on the same subject, available on the CERI Internet site (www.ceri-sciences-po.org).

CONTENTS

1 The problem of drug production and state stability

2 The transition from war economies to peace economies: the role of opium

3 Cannabis in Africa: rural economies and state stability

4 Coca and political demands in South America

5 Relationship between drug production and state stability

6 Tables: development of agricultural drug production and of surface areas under cultivation

7 World map of production areas for the three main 'drug plants'

8 Selected bibliography

The present report follows a seminar held in Paris, France, by the CERI, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy (CNRS-PRODIG) and Laurent Laniel (INHES), with the collaboration of the CPSH, thanks to the support of the SGDN[2].

The study day brought together researchers and specialists in a variety of disciplines and of a variety of nationalities with a view to addressing the complex question of the relationship between agricultural drug production and state security. Many questions are raised by the issue. Should agricultural drug production be viewed as a consequence and/or a cause of state instability? Is such agricultural production systematically destabilising or does it, in some contexts, help maintain a socio-economic and therefore political status quo, even easing transition from a war economy to a peace economy? Finally, how far might a state's stability or instability foster resorting to agricultural drug production?

The aim of the seminar was therefore to paint as comprehensive a picture as possible of the world situation – without, of course, claiming to be exhaustive. Speakers addressed the three main drug plants – the opium poppy, the cannabis plant and the coca tree – and the three continents where they are grown, and where their cultivation is or was connected to situations of armed or social-political conflict: Asia, Africa and South America.

Alain Labrousse, former director of the Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD – Geopolitical Drug Watch), a top specialist in world drug geopolitics and author of several books and papers on the subject, introduced the study day by painting a global picture of the regions and contexts in which the three drug plants are produced.

Opium in transitions from war economies to peace economies in Asia

The day's first session, which was devoted to Asia and to the role of opium in transitions from war economies to peace economies, was led by Jeremy Milsom, an Australian doctoral student (Melbourne University), David Mansfield, an independent consultant from Britain, and Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy (CNRS-PRODIG), a French geographer and CNRS research fellow.

Jeremy Milsom, who has had considerable field experience in the northern part of the Shan state of Burma held by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), detailed and analysed the political context and socio-economic factors explaining the resort to opium production in the

[2] The authors wish to extend special thanks to Jasmine Zérinini (SGDN) for her support of this project and her useful remarks on a draft version of this report.

UWSA's special region n° 2. He laid particularly strong emphasis on the difficult survival conditions for the region's opium farmers in the present context of accelerated suppression of opium production, and on how such conditions could jeopardise the precarious political stability of the Wa authorities and their territory.

David Mansfield, who has paid lengthy visits to and made numerous studies of the subject in Afghanistan, presented the Afghan opium problem in all its complexity by addressing the diversity of situations experienced by opium farmers in the eastern province of Nangarhar. He put special emphasis on the counter-productivity and unintended effects of rapid suppression of opium production, above all in terms of economic growth and political stability.

Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, who has been comparing the Afghan and Burmese opium production contexts over the last ten years, stressed the role that the opium economy played in their respective war economy contexts and the role it has played in their recent transitions to peace economies. He observed that although opium production clearly originated from the instability of the two States concerned, it later became more the result of major food supply uncertainties, which did not threaten security in strategic terms.

Two speakers, Christian Lechervy (Sciences-Po) and Olivier Roy (CNRS-CERI), specialists in Burmese and Afghan questions, respectively, expanded upon questions posed by the speakers by emphasising the complexity of continental South-East Asian, Central Asian and South Asian regional contexts.

Cannabis in Africa: rural economies and state stability

The second session was devoted to the African cannabis economies, and called upon two speakers to address the much less researched relationship between cannabis production and state stability in Africa: Kenza Afsahi, a Moroccan Ph.D. student in economics, and Laurent Laniel, a French sociologist and INHES research fellow.

Kenza Afsahi, who for the past few years has been carrying out research for her doctoral thesis on the cannabis farming economy in the Rif Mountains of northern Morocco, explained the economic, political, cultural and historical context of cannabis cultivation in the region. She explained how this economic activity, which has grown considerably over the last twenty years, has permitted the maintenance of a type of socio-economic and political status quo. She also warned of the 'time bomb' that lack of management of the situation has created.

Laurent Laniel, who has been working on drug-related geopolitical and strategic issues for the last fifteen years, addressed the difficult and little-understood question of development of cannabis cultivation in sub-Saharan Africa in the context of economic and political crises. Is cannabis an alternative to development in sub-Saharan Africa? Perhaps, he said, since no alternative development programme has been implemented in Africa.

Jean-Marc Balencie, a private-sector consultant on sub-Saharan Africa, and co-author of the 'Mondes rebelles' volumes, opened this session's discussion by an overview of the role that cannabis has played in a number of African conflicts.

Coca and political demands in South America

During the final session, three speakers analysed the various political movements brought about by the defence of coca cultivation – targeted for eradication as part of an American-inspired 'war on drugs' – in the three Andean countries that are the world's main producers: Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. Dionicio Núñez, a member of MAS, the leading Bolivian opposition party[3], pointed out that, since the economic crisis of the 1980s, coca cultivation has ensured the survival of thousands of families. For the Aymara and Quechua, who make up the majority of the country's population, the coca leaf is a sacred plant with many virtues, whose cultivation and use – controlled but legal – should be clearly distinguished from those of an illegal drug such as cocaine. Rejecting forcible eradication of coca as an unjust and ineffective policy in the war on cocaine, the Aymara representative called for measures to industrialise production of legal coca leaf derivative products. In his opinion, such measures would afford farmers a legal outlet for their produce, which they would then no longer have to sell to drug traffickers.

The Colombian anthropologist María Clemencia Ramírez emphasised the differences between the Bolivian case and that of Colombia, the world's top producer of coca and cocaine. In the latter country, farmers – who are for the most part extremely poor and live in regions controlled by armed groups (guerrillas and paramilitary forces) rather than the state – have no cultural attachment to coca, and only grow it because it offers a larger income than other possible agricultural produce. This absence of cultural ties to the plant has led to the Colombian authorities feeling justified in criminalizing coca cultivation and resorting to the

[3] The MAS has become the ruling party following the general election of January 2006.

extreme measures advocated by Washington (aerial herbicide spraying), which are prohibited in Bolivia and Peru.

Ricardo Soberón Garrido, a Peruvian jurist, looked at the effects of anti-drug policies implemented in Andean countries in the light of the Peruvian case. In a context of poverty and lack of development, coca cultivation has seen cycles of expansion since the 1970s, in line with fluctuations in demand on consumer markets. These cycles, accompanied by ever increasing violence (due to traffickers as much as to the police and the military), have made drug trafficking a central and lasting component of Andean social, economic and political reality. In Soberón's view, this recent situation has allowed the United States to increase its influence on regional governments, which limits Andean countries' independence, weakening their democratic institutions and disastrously undermining human rights.

Olivier Dabène, a CERI research fellow, opened the discussion by observing that anti-drug policies implemented in South America have so far proved to be not only ineffective but, above all, counterproductive, inciting major antagonism towards their leading promoter, the United States.

Conclusions

The final word went to Alfred McCoy, a historian at the university of Wisconsin-Madison whose book, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, first published in 1972, has become the reference work on the strategic manipulation of the drug economies in South-East Asia during the Cold War. After summarising the day's discussions, Professor McCoy presented his analyses and opinions of the repeated setbacks in almost thirty years of a 'war on drugs' which has not stopped an increase in terms of world surface area where opium poppies, coca and probably cannabis are grown, and which has also had unintended consequences, especially in terms of state stability, militarisation of primarily economic and social issues, democracy, and human rights[4].

[4] These arguments are developed in his article, 'The Stimulus of Prohibition' (2004: 26): "Despite four 'wars on drugs' waged by the United States for a total cost of US $150 billion, world illegal opium production increased fivefold, from 1,200 tonnes in 1971 to 6,100 tonnes in 1999. Similarly, after fifteen years of attempted eradication in the Andean countries, carried out by their governments at American instigation, coca leaf production had doubled, reaching 6,000 tonnes in 1999. In the three decades following the start of the 'war on drugs', the number of heroin users in the United States increased more than tenfold, from 68,000 to 980,000".

Study Day Programme:

'Drug production and state stability'

Centre d'études et de recherches internationales (CERI), Paris, Thursday, 6 October 2005

Introductory remarks: Alain Labrousse (former director of the OGD, Paris)

Opium in transitions from war economies to peace economies in Asia

Session President: Alain Labrousse. Debaters: Christian Lechervy (Sciences Po) and Olivier Roy (CNRS-CERI).

Jeremy Milsom (Melbourne University)
Burma: political economy of opium elimination.
David Mansfield (independent consultant)
Afghanistan: opium economy, state consolidation and state building
Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy (CNRS-PRODIG)
Opium in Asia: assessments and risks in terms of state stability.

Cannabis in Africa: rural economies and state stability

Session President: Bernard Frahi (UNODC). Debater: Jean-Marc Balencie (independent consultant).

Kenza Afsahi (University of Lille)
Morocco: cannabis, time bomb or guarantee of status quo?
Laurent Laniel (INHES)
Cannabis in sub-Saharan Africa: an alternative to development?

Coca and political demands in South America

Session President: Alfred McCoy (University of Wisconsin-Madison). Debater: Olivier Dabène (CERI).

Dionicio Núñez Tancara (representative, MAS, Bolivia)

Cocalero syndicalism and political action in Bolivia

María Clemencia Ramírez (ICANH-Bogota/Harvard)

Plan Colombia, peace plan or war plan?

Ricardo Soberón Garrido (TNI, Amsterdam)

The coca leaf in Andean countries: policies and cultivation in regard to state stability

Conclusion: Alfred McCoy (Professor, University of Wisconsin-Madison)

DRUG PRODUCTION AND STATE STABILITY

Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy and Laurent Laniel

1. The problem of drug production and state stability

The current state of knowledge in France

Despite advances over the last ten years, there are still many gaps in the French knowledge and understanding of the phenomena relating to illegal drugs and international security. Existing knowledge and understanding come almost exclusively from official national and international institutions whose main concern is the *war on* drugs (UN agencies, police forces, armed forces and national health agencies, etc.). Such institutional knowledge at least has the merit of existing, and may be one of the foundations for acquisition of more detailed knowledge and, above all, for a better understanding of the realities in play.

Understanding the problem of illegal drugs as objectively as possible in order to improve international security requires grasping and analysing the causes of these social phenomena, not simply their consequences or manifestations. Therefore it is necessary to study not only observable things, phenomena and facts, but also, and above all, the ways in which they are perceived by the parties concerned.

The boom of drug studies experienced in the United States is in sharp contrast with the lack of interest shown in France, where "drugs" is still often perceived as a subject 'unworthy' of researchers. Yet, drugs are important to France's internal and external security. Because it is illegal, drug production may affect international security, above all through the armed violence it creates and the uses to which resulting profits are put (financing of armed groups and criminal organisations, and even – as has been recently though mostly erroneously claimed – terrorist organisations). However, it is important to avoid restricting the question of drug production to security issues, and instead to examine the phenomenon overall in an analysis encompassing everything from the causes of the recourse to an illegal drug economy to the effects of official responses.

It is for this reason that a research group set up in 2004 by Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy (CNRS) and Laurent Laniel (INHES) brought together speakers of different nationalities and backgrounds, for a conference devoted to the connection between drug production and state security at the CERI and with the support of the SGDN. Through case studies selected from the main regions of illegal agricultural drug production, the 'Drug production and state

stability' conference (Paris, 6 October 2005) aimed to produce a better understanding of how such production might foster the emergence and prolongation of conflict or, conversely, prevent crises in certain situations. With the selected examples (Afghanistan, West Africa, Burma, Bolivia, Colombia, Morocco and Peru) as starting points, the question to be explored was that of the possible connections between the agricultural economy of illegal drugs and conflict, in the all-important context of underdevelopment and, *a fortiori*, of globalisation.

Local conditions of recourse to an illegal drug economy

In these countries, the regions where cultivation of opium poppies, coca or cannabis takes place all suffer from varying degrees of food-supply deficiency, and sometimes do not benefit (the Wa region in Burma), or no longer benefit (destruction of irrigation canals in Afghanistan), from irrigation techniques or the means to implement them. In Morocco's Rif mountains, the tendency towards single-crop cultivation of cannabis, an economic "godsend" in this ecologically fragile region, has led to progressive abandonment of food-producing agriculture, with all the resulting adverse effects.

But besides these factors, which specifically relate to methods of agricultural exploitation, the recourse to an illegal drug economy is also encouraged by the special characteristics of drug markets at the local, national and international level. Farm-gate prices for opium, coca and cannabis are generally far higher than those of food crops (wheat, rice, barley, maize, yucca, yam, etc.) or even cash crops (cocoa, coffee, tea, bananas, sugar cane, citrus fruit, etc.). At any rate, in the contexts of underdevelopment in which these regions find themselves, licit agricultural products do not allow the inhabitants of the regions at hand to be self-sufficient in food. Furthermore, unlike other agricultural crops opium and cannabis derivatives (hashish and marijuana) keep for a long time and can therefore be stored by farmers, for whom they often represent an essential form of savings.

In contrast, once harvested coca leaves rapidly lose most of their active properties. Therefore they must be quickly transformed into 'coca paste' (an intermediary product from which cocaine is then refined) by a simple chemical process, which has been carried out by the farmers themselves for the last ten years or so. Thus, coca farmers are often more than just farmers: they play a more important role in the illegal economy, and are therefore a little more dependent on it. Moreover, coca (but not 'coca paste' or cocaine) is not an illegal commodity in Bolivia and Peru because it also has legal and highly valued uses in Andean societies as a whole, while playing a central role in the culture of indigenous Quechua and Aymara people.

Coca's ambiguity has, as a commodity which is both legal and illegal, made the question of its cultivation in Bolivia and Peru all the more intricate.

Opium, coca and cannabis, as high-value, sought-after products, are also a special case in that they allow many farmers access to credit – as in Afghanistan, for example, where the *salaam* system has opium being bought by negotiators a year or two in advance, or farmers being able to borrow on forecasts of future crops. At global level, the illegal drug market still benefits from the fact that although supply is elastic, demand is not.

As Alain Labrousse explained, "Coca, opium poppies and cannabis have become an element in the survival strategies of these peoples who live in economies which are globalising, even if the farmers only pick up the crumbs of the production, transformation and distribution system set up by traffickers."

Adverse effects of recourse to an illegal drug economy may also result from other activities that are legal in themselves. Environmental issues and human health also lie at the heart of the problematic recourse to the agricultural economy of illegal drugs, as regards both causes and consequences: poppy or cannabis cultivation regions are marked by uncertain rainfall uncompensated for by irrigation; fast degradation of forest cover (slash and burn) and soil potential (soil erosion and depletion, notably in Bolivia, Morocco and Peru); ground and river pollution (by waste from chemicals used to produce heroin, 'coca paste', cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride); increased consumption of opium and/or heroin, cocaine base paste or hydrochloride, and marijuana, along with increased addiction rates and the spread of HIV/AIDS through intravenous injection in unsanitary conditions; and persecution of users (in West Africa and Burma). The public policies of forcible eradication by spraying chemical herbicides also have adverse effects on the health of people and livestock and on legal agricultural production. Generally speaking, spraying of this kind runs counter to environmental protection. If used, the biological defoliants (mycoherbicides) that are already being tested risk even more negative consequences.

In Afghanistan and Burma, opium, the sinews of war, has become one of its main stakes, conditioning economic development to obtaining peace – and *vice-versa*. In Bolivia, the severe social conflict between Indian coca producers in the tropical Andean foothills and the Creole government in La Paz supported by Washington, has taken on socio-economic, ethnic and geopolitical dimensions. In Morocco, a history of contention between Riffian Berbers and the state has done much to encourage the latter to leave the farmers in peace and to tolerate the illegal cultivation of cannabis that is taking place in the Rif. By contrast, in West Africa it would appear that cannabis cultivation is a socio-political response by local elites to structural

setbacks (exhaustion of forest reserves) affecting the main legal export agricultural product, cocoa. In this case, cannabis production seems to contribute to preserving the status quo. In what conditions, then, and to what extent does an illegal drug economy lead to perpetuation or prevention of conflict when economic development or the very survival of certain peoples is in question? And what are the effects of agricultural production of illegal drugs depending upon whether producing countries are in conflict situations or not? Does an illegal drug economy necessarily lead to continuation of conflict, or can it also serve to maintain fragile political and economic stability in some cases?

2. The transition from war economies to peace economies: the role of opium

Connections between war and drug production

In Asia, the stability and instability of a number of States have been affected, sometimes even conditioned, by the existence of illegal agricultural production and the ensuing illegal trade. But, through loss of political control on territory, the instability of certain states has simultaneously made possible and even encouraged development of such agricultural production and trafficking.

Significant systemic effects have long existed between guerrilla economies and civil war economies on the one hand, and the economies resulting from illegal activities on the other. War economies and drug economies have a long common history, in Asia and elsewhere.

In Burma, as in Afghanistan, the opium economy has been partly responsible for financing the war efforts of some of the opposing factions. But if opium has been one of the sinews of war for Burmese and Afghan guerrillas, it often subsequently has become one of the stakes of war.

Logically, the strong synergies existing between a civil war economy and drug economy have therefore weighed upon the two countries' potential for political and economic development. As well as allowing and even encouraging prolongation of conflict and making any resolution of crises all the more difficult, the conflict/drug 'synergy' has also laid the foundations for criminalization of these countries' peace economies, so potentially compromising the stability of their states.

Through these connections with the war economy, the opium economy has certainly had a destabilising effect in the recent histories of Afghanistan and Burma. But "While the opium economy has surely helped perpetuate the Afghan and Burmese conflicts, it did not cause

them, and the current politico-territorial and economic crises in the two countries did not result from it – at least, not directly. Nor did the opium economy simply finance some of the parties at war to a greater or lesser extent, it also enabled some of the two countries' farmers to survive as best as they could during long periods of economic depression". (Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy)

State reconstruction and suppression of opium production

At present, both Afghanistan and Burma are making gradual and fragile transitions to peace economies and have to face up to the many legacies of their respective conflicts: opium production, major underdevelopment and extreme poverty, especially in rural areas.

Despite the considerable differences between them, both countries have a number of characteristics in common, two of which are of particular relevance here: opium production, and precarious and relative peace situations. The opium economy seems to be perceived as a different threat in Afghanistan, where it is often presented as the major obstacle in the way of the country's political and economic reconstruction, and in Burma, where the tensions and conflicts between the military dictatorship and the democrats and a number of ethnic minorities are the main obstacles to development.

Projects for accelerated suppression of the opium economy, some at the planning stage and some currently underway, that risk compromising the food security of producers and destabilising transitions to a peace economy are the main common factor between the two countries.

In Afghanistan, where a fragile peace and relative security allow gradual state reconstruction, and in Burma, where ceasefires between the junta and the rebel armies have multiplied over the last ten years, the question is now whether or not the opium economy threatens to destabilise these early stages of transition.

The question is further complicated since it is also necessary to determine whether solutions such as opium poppy eradication or abrupt prohibition of its cultivation might in themselves lead to economic, social and political instability.

In Afghanistan, the institution of a democratic regime, however imperfect, is in contrast with the continuation, even reinforcement, of Burma's dictatorial military regime, which means taking a different view of the threat represented by the opium economy. In Afghanistan, the main threat is said to reside in the opium economy, with its capacity for financing Taliban resistance and international insecurity – not to mention terrorism – as well as the state corruption that it engenders. In Burma, where local conflicts have continued since the

country's independence in 1948, the main threat is more political and military in nature since the xenophobia and isolationism of the ruling junta could well threaten the ceasefires agreed with ethnic groups in outlying areas of the country. Deterioration of relations between the junta and the United Wa State Army, for example, would in all likelihood have an impact on the process of opium production suppression currently underway.

However, there are new points in common. Both countries face major pressure from international and domestic organisations and donor countries to suppress the opium economy using very similar means. It is all too possible that such projects constitute a grave risk of destabilisation – if not of the states concerned, at least of the construction of their peace economies.

In Afghanistan, the people and their government are still in the difficult process of recovering from over 20 years of war and destructive partisan divisions, while endeavouring to recover from one of the world's worst economic situations.

While the opium economy fosters corruption in the society at large and provides resources for parties opposed to state reconstruction, above all it seems to increase corruption in the central government and provincial authorities. However, opium cannot be blamed for corruption and opposition to state reconstruction. In the same way that the opium economy resulted from the Afghan conflicts, it is now perpetuated by the country's extreme underdevelopment, and as such it is a consequence of Afghanistan's political and economic crisis. If there is a challenge to be faced up to in Afghanistan, in addition to sustaining peace, it is economic development.

Risks of forcible eradication without economic compensation

The Burmese situation differs on several points from that of Afghanistan. On the one hand, the issue is not state-building but the fragility and illegitimate nature of the state already in place. On the other hand, the junta in power has for years tacitly authorised certain autonomous ethnic groups to resort to the production and trafficking of opiates within the framework of ceasefires concluded with them.

In Burma, opium has long played a major role in strategic negotiations. The recent significant reduction in production, against the background of the junta's inner crisis, represents a serious risk of economic, social and political instability, since the ill-prepared opium suppression programmes were not supported by sufficient development programmes that offered alternative revenue for the farmers concerned.

As Jeremy Milsom explains, the humanitarian crisis that has already struck the Kokang region and that now threatens the Wa region stems directly from the ban on opium production proclaimed by the local ethnic groups and their armies (MNDAA and UWSA respectively). Even though the Wa Central Committee has planned for the ban since 1990 and has implemented three five-year development plans that have somewhat improved to a degree health, education, infrastructure and agricultural enterprises, hundreds of thousands continue to lack the means to make up for the money and food deficits the ban has caused.

Geographical and political isolation of the regions under consideration, worsened by Burma's pariah status, has led to there being very little early international intervention to offset the dual deficit now bound to occur: structural deficits in rice and lack of money to buy any, with no obvious way out.

Within such contexts, abruptly implemented programmes that have not shown much economic consideration are a security threat, since they may generate economic, social and *a fortiori* political instability. Opium production in Afghanistan and Burma is no longer primarily an issue of military security but rather a question of food security, and therefore an economic and political problem.

The history of the 'war on drugs' in Asia and Latin America clearly shows – as highlighted by the latest World Bank report on Afghanistan, and as developed by David Mansfield in speaking of the same country – that the banning and eradication of opium poppies are counterproductive if they are not preceded by implementation of development programmes leading to substitution of one economy for another and certain ways of life for others.

The thirty years of reduction in opium production in Thailand illustrate to a certain extent that sustainable success can be achieved in this field. Even though the Thailand results may not be perfect and lend themselves – as do some of the methods and means deployed – to controversy, it has to be admitted that large-scale commercial opium production has been suppressed in a sustainable manner in the Kingdom. This success is largely due to the fact that, since the beginning of the implementation of poppy growing suppression programmes, the King of Thailand has made crop substitution and integrated development of the country's highlands a prerequisite to any forcible eradication. Initial introduction of crop substitution in opium producer areas took place in the early 1970s, before rural integrated development projects took over in the 1980s, to be followed by participatory alternative development in the 1990s. Each phase provided lessons to be learnt concerning errors previously committed, so helping to correct adverse effects. It is worth mentioning that it was only in 1984 that the Thai

authorities started to resort to forcible eradication, once the development programmes and projects were largely underway.

Some projects, such as the one run by the Mae Fah Luang Foundation in Doi Tung, are still ongoing, and their results have attracted the interest of the Afghan authorities. The case of Thailand, like that of Pakistan – where production was virtually suppressed, but under different conditions – has therefore shown that suppression of illegal opium production can be achieved in a sustainable manner if the most appropriate and logical development measures are applied some years before law enforcement measures are taken. This, however, was a lesson evidently not learnt in Laos, where accelerated suppression of opium production over the past few years placed many opium farmers in a situation of great hardship.

Results in Thailand and Pakistan were in any case only relatively successful, since the falls in their respective opium production were compensated for, regionally and worldwide, by increased production on the part of some of their neighbours, Afghanistan and Burma in particular. Although known and foreseeable, this "balloon effect" phenomenon is never taken into consideration at the design and implementation stages of programmes for reduction in illegal agricultural drug production and is often yet another adverse effect added to those caused by too rapid suppression.

In addition to causing serious food insecurity for drug producing people, forcible suppression of such farming activities causes systematic hikes in opium farm-gate prices, making production all the more attractive. Moreover, in phases of transition from a war to peace economy, abrupt suppression and eradication without economic consideration sow the seeds of potentially dangerous social unrest.

Eradication without compensation also creates a number of other risks with multiple adverse effects: increase in predation economies, especially trafficking in human beings, prostitution, illegal trading of wood, protected species, antiques, weapons and contraband. It is therefore potentially destabilising, while rarely enabling targeted production to be permanently suppressed or curbed, and does not address the economic causes behind the resort to illegal drug production in the first place. On the contrary, it accentuates these causes since it increases the poverty and underdevelopment of drug producing countries and peoples, which are amongst the poorest in the world.

3. Cannabis in Africa: rural economies and state stability

A necessary production that is more economic than strategic

Although cannabis appears to be very widely cultivated in Africa, the poorest continent in the world with a post-colonial history marked by a succession of armed conflicts, knowledge of the cannabis economy is at best fragmented. In its *World Drug Report 2005*, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) states, "*There is very little reliable information on the extent of cannabis cultivation [throughout the world]. Although cannabis is the most consumed illegal drug, accurate knowledge of quantities produced is much more limited than for other drug plants".* The widest gaps in knowledge probably concern the African situation, as there are very few field studies on sub-Saharan cannabis production.

In world literature, opium poppy production and coca production are the subjects of more frequent and in-depth studies than cannabis: so much so that Asia and South America are the focus of all the attention of anti-drug organisations and alternative development projects of aid agencies. In a provocative but highly relevant manner, Laurent Laniel presents cannabis production in Africa as a possible 'alternative to development' with the cannabis economy enabling many African farmers to make up for the underdevelopment that they have been faced with for several decades. The cannabis economy would thus contribute to maintaining 'a certain level of stability' and would therefore 'guarantee a socio-economic status quo'.

Based on the few studies available, it may be estimated that illegal cannabis production in sub-Saharan Africa has boomed over the last 25 years, due to the implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). This increase may be explained – at least in part – by the deterioration of national economic situations, since falling living standards stimulate both demand and supply of cannabis in Africa. The fall in prices of agricultural raw materials on world markets, the deregulation implemented in many sectors, especially agriculture, and ecological setbacks have often resulted in a very sharp drop in the revenue of many players in the agricultural as well as the trade and transport sectors. State coffers, and the civil servants that informally 'tax' economic activities, have also suffered a severe loss of income due to the crisis of agriculture.

Because cannabis can adapt to a wide range of environmental settings, even to degraded or naturally poor quality soil, it may be grown on lands unsuitable for other crops. Given this 'performance', it may be integrated into agricultural production systems practically regardless of the agro and economic criteria normally governing them, namely access to land, capital and workforce. This means that cannabis cultivation is accessible to a wide range of farmers and, under present conditions, it seems to be imposing itself as an alternative crop of prime importance from West Africa to Central Africa, to southern Africa.

Generally speaking, cannabis production in Africa is more of an economic necessity than a strategic one since little revenue from cannabis is used for financing armed conflicts, unlike past situations in Afghanistan and Burma, and present-day Colombia. Cannabis certainly has a role in African conflicts, but probably less as a financial resource than as the fighters' consumer product of choice.

In sub-Saharan Africa, cannabis thus appears above all to be symptomatic of the existence of problems of economic, political and ecological instability and not the cause of such problems. It therefore seems clear that development of cannabis cultivation in Africa is more a consequence of the continent's socio-economic instability than one of its causes.

The Moroccan Rif: threatened stability

The existence of links between cannabis production and social, economic and political stability is also at issue in North Africa, precisely in Morocco, where the first UNODC enquiry was conducted in 2003 in the northern Rif region. The UN Agency confirmed the extent of cannabis cultivation in Morocco, estimating that at least 130,000 hectares of cannabis were under cultivation in 2003 – the same surface occupied by opium poppy crops in Afghanistan in 2004.

Kenza Afsahi raises the issue of the role and place of cannabis within the Moroccan context in terms very similar to those used by Laurent Laniel for sub-Saharan Africa. She describes how cannabis crops guarantee a certain 'status quo', and the economic and social consequences of the failure of this system.

The Rif is not only a region of cannabis cultivation but also one of the poorest in Morocco, with population density three times higher than in the rest of the country and one of the highest demographic growths. Within the context of the Rif, where natural conditions do not enable its largely rural population to develop sufficient food-producing and commercial agriculture, the cannabis economy can subsidise basic needs. As the region's economic development has never featured among the Moroccan state's priorities, cannabis production has become the region's main economic activity – 75% of the villages, totalling 96,000 families or 800,000 people, resort to it. Cannabis has kept the population within the region while mitigating economic and political resentment.

Morocco is now the world's main source of hashish, which is largely exported to the European market. The Rif economy and *a fortiori* its socio-economic and political stability depend on this production – a fact that poses a major problem for both the Moroccan state and

the European Union, since hashish production and consumption are illegal in Morocco and in most of the EU countries, including France.

Following the publication of the first United Nations survey on cannabis in Morocco, the Moroccan state, which has long tolerated cannabis production in order to make up for its inability and lack of political will to promote Riffian development, can no longer ignore the region's economic and social problems. Moreover, overexploitation of the environment by a rapidly expanding population does indeed represent a grave risk of ecological crisis and eventually, within this largely agricultural context, of serious economic and social crisis.

State tolerance of this illegal activity partially stems from the region's cultural and political context, with past unrest of the Rif Berbers lending weight to their claim to the right to cultivate cannabis. Tolerance may also be explained by the potentially explosive outcome, in economic and social terms, of any effective prohibition of cannabis within the region.

The agricultural cannabis economy significantly regulates employment in the Rif region, especially for young farmers. Driven by poverty, leaving the areas with no or little water and arable land and villages subject to recurrent checks by the authorities, they emigrate to regions in need of labour. Cannabis, which can grow on otherwise unproductive land, and even on non-irrigated land, can keep part of the population from leaving the region by affording them a living.

Although illegal, this crop clearly stems from a status quo between the state and the Riffian villages, and its tolerance is an alternative to an underdevelopment against which the authorities take no action. There is little doubt that cannabis has stabilised the economy of a region all but excluded from national development. However, the Rif remains faced with a fragile ecology, loss of traditional farming know-how and international pressure demanding elimination of drug plants in southern countries.

Morocco will have to reduce cannabis crops in the Rif and find a viable and sustainable economic alternative, if not because this crop is illegal and the cause of increasing international pressure, then at least because the region's ecological-economic balance is threatened in the very short term. An increasing population, along with the divvying up of land-holdings that this entails, cannot cope with limited availability of arable land and its rapid and intense degradation.

The complexity of the Riffian context in economic, social and ecological terms requires that the situation be promptly and reasonably managed with a view to development. The challenge of cannabis in the Rif is of sustainable economic development for one of the country's poorest regions, where socio-economic stability is under threat. The whole of Africa

is concerned by the cannabis economy and the alternative to the development that it represents from Morocco to South Africa. Clearly stemming from socio-economic inequalities and underdevelopment, the cannabis economy raises two significant issues on the African continent, one ecological and the other legal, that only appropriate political and economic measures can solve without large-scale economic crises resulting in major instability.

4. Coca and political demands in South America

Legal and illegal production

Coca is not the only 'drug plant' cultivated in South America, but it is the one that gives rise to the most questions in terms of stability, given the amount and intensiveness of the political demands it generates. Neither cannabis, which is also produced on a very large scale in Brazil and Paraguay (and in smaller ways in other South American countries) nor even the opium poppy, which is grown in Colombia and Peru, occasion so much controversy and conflict, or lead to the expression of so many demands.

We should once again remind ourselves that, in terms of connections between coca and state stability, the situation in the three Andean countries – Bolivia, Colombia and Peru – although similar in some ways, currently diverge in two crucial aspects. Firstly, fairly large quantities of coca leaves are produced quite legally in Bolivia and Peru, and their transformation and marketing are controlled by state monopolies. Despite the existence of a number of 'bridges', this legal production is historically, geographically and socially separated from production of 'excess' leaves (so called because they exceed the quotas fixed by national legislation), which government programmes seek to eradicate. In Colombia, a number of indigenous groups grow coca, using the leaves for themselves, and their activities are tolerated by the authorities. It is rarely referred to, but this traditional production does exist even if it is nothing compared to the total Colombian output of coca leaves (bridges also exist here). Supplying cocaine laboratories, most of the coca grown in Colombia is labelled 'illegal' and targeted for eradication. Secondly, only Colombia, by far the leading world producer of coca leaves, is the scene of ongoing armed conflict, fuelled to a large extent by cocaine trafficking. Development of this conflict may affect illegal agricultural production, not only in Colombia but also in Bolivia and Peru.

Coca development against a backdrop of underdevelopment and political instability

The causes and stakes of the conflict in Colombia, which shall be reviewed below, lead us to consider a problem common to all three countries: territorial control and the legal and illegal resources stemming from it. The stability of all three states has been affected by the existence of illegal coca production. This latter, however, has come about specifically in territories where governments, although nominally sovereign, have been and still are effectively absent. Furthermore, these outlying areas, once considered 'virgin' (but in fact populated by indigenous people), on the eastern foothills of the Andes (and the plains lying beneath them) – the Amazonian slopes of the Cordillera, where coca has been cultivated for at least 2000 years – were termed 'agricultural frontiers' by the governments of the 1970s. Tens of thousands of internal migrants settled there in the 1980s and 1990s. In Colombia, these migrants were fleeing, of their own free will or under compulsion, the violence raging around land rights in their home territories caused by absence of agrarian reform in a context of highly concentrated land ownership and population growth. They found refuge in the Deep South Amazonian regions of Caquetá, Guaviare, Putumayo, and Vaupés. In Peru, they hoped to escape the ravages of unemployment and galloping inflation resulting from the debt crisis, by settling in the *Selva Alta* (High Forest), where they sometimes fell victim to the Shining Path. Finally, in Bolivia the debt crisis and structural adjustment led to closure of tin mines, the country's main employer, and to mass migration to the tropical Chapare region of former miners become coca growers (Dionicio Núñez).

The recent migration waves to these Amazon pioneer fronts were therefore more or less encouraged by all three states, for which they acted as 'safety valves'. A 'surplus' population could be drained off, which the formal economy (and informal urban economy) could not (or no longer) integrate, and which would have most likely ended up by producing political instability had it not been evacuated in this way, at least temporarily. It was a safety valve that the said states rapidly decided to forget about. The development infrastructure (roads, electricity, piped water, schools, dispensaries, etc.) promised by the governments never materialised, and the only practical living to be made in these areas was by growing illegal crops. Most of the time, the crop of choice has been coca, which is easily transported as 'coca paste', an intermediary product whose price pays for the producer's work and investment.

The pre-existence of economic underdevelopment in Bolivia and Peru, coupled with political instability in Colombia, goes a long way to explaining the expansion of coca cropping since the 1980s – an activity that prolongs both underdevelopment and armed conflict, but which is not the cause of either.

The North American factor

This is not, however, the diagnosis which prevails in Andean governments and in Washington, where illegal plantations are viewed as a major factor in Andean instability and a threat to the national security of the United States. In this respect, the present governments of Andean countries have subordinated their policies, in particular as regards drugs, but also in matters of economics and trade, to the wishes of the United States (Ricardo Soberón). Such submission may doubtless be explained by the intransigent, even intimidating stance adopted by Washington. The United States now considers that "a causal link (exists) between instability anywhere in the (western) hemisphere and a threat to United States security", and proclaims itself ready to counter "non-territorialized threats coming from 'hostile' or 'disruptive' governments and regional political players" (María Clemencia Ramírez). American interests do not necessarily conform to those of all sectors of Andean society. The free trade agreements that the United States has signed or hopes to sign with Andean countries may, in particular, become factors of instability – if, for example, they lead to replacement of certain national agricultural products (grain, in particular) by subsidised imports from the United States.

Programmes of forcible eradication of coca fields are underway in all three Andean countries. The programme with the most immediate destabilising potential is implemented in the south of Colombia, in the context of Plan Colombia and, after it came to an end in September 2005, subsequent programmes such as *Plan Patriota*. It has come together with an unprecedented military offensive aimed at taking back territorial control from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla movement, which recently announced the launching of a counter-offensive. While the Colombian military has succeeded in imposing its authority on areas where guerrillas once made the law, they have not altogether managed to set up meaningful forms of governance in them. With the military in place, the remainder of the state apparatus has failed to make itself felt in these remote areas. This is one of the bitterest lessons to be learned from Plan Colombia: while it is not too difficult to capture a territory once held by insurgents, governing it is another matter altogether. The latter requires mobilisation of non-military resources along with strong political will, two conditions that have been largely lacking here. The present *Plan Patriota* offensive is taking the same road. As a result, as far as the inhabitants of these areas are concerned, the state—which has historically been absent—is now present but only as one more armed group, and with no stronger legitimacy than the others. This same state is also

responsible for destruction of coca plantations (read: the main source of revenue for the local population) by aerial spraying of herbicides that also often destroy food crops. Meanwhile, alternative development programmes, supposed to compensate for the disappearance of coca fields and its consequences, have turned out to be altogether insufficient. Aerial spraying, a measure inspired by the United States and put into effect by U.S. companies under contract to the Pentagon, delegitimises the Colombian state, since "Rather than contribute to the strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, these [aerial spraying] programs reflect an authoritarian stance and the undermining of national sovereignty through the open and unrestricted intervention of the United States in Colombia's economic, social and political affairs" (María Clemencia Ramírez). The paradox and irony of this situation is that loss of legitimacy and sovereignty is justified by a proclaimed need to restore good governance, stability and order.

Emergence of the Cocalero movement in Bolivia and Peru

Forcible eradication programmes undertaken in Peru and Bolivia have not resorted to use of chemical products with little-known effects, but have been implemented manually by military units and paramilitary police trained according to concepts coming directly from the United States, sometimes with accompanying finance. Programmes implemented since the 1990s have succeeded in reducing surface areas planted with coca in the two countries (while they are expanding in Colombia), but there is nothing to suggest any reduction will be sustainable in the long term. Such uncertainty is largely due to the fact that reduction has been achieved at the price of multiple violent confrontations with increasingly well-organised *cocaleros* (or coca growers). In Bolivia, Aymara and Quechua growers of 'legal' and 'excess' coca, cashing in on a long experience of trade-unionism acquired in the tin mines, are particularly well organised. They have shown that they can resist eradication, by force if necessary, and that they can express their demands strongly. In a context of major social, ethnic and political discontent and grave economic problems in the poorest country on the American continent, the Bolivian *cocaleros* have been able to build a vast political coalition around themselves. Under the name Movement to Socialism (*Movimiento al socialismo* – MAS), they could well win the next general election and see their leader, Evo Morales, accede to the presidency[5]. He would be the first indigenous president of a country which, up until now, has always been governed by white or mixed-race Creoles, even though its

[5] The MAS has, in fact, won the general election of January 2006, and Evo Morales has become the president of Bolivia.

population is largely Indian. The MAS political platform combines rejection of the 'American empire' and its neo-liberal policies with the moulding of a modern indigenous identity. The symbol of this identity is none other than the coca leaf, cultivation of which Morales could legalise altogether were he to come to power. A MAS victory at the elections could provoke major instability as the United States is resolutely opposed to the party and even more so to changing the law on coca. Besides this, the political groups representing gas interests in Santa Cruz Province are themselves opposed to MAS and are threatening to secede. Tensions are mounting at a time when Paraguay authorised Washington to station up to 400 marines on its territory for a series of exercises scheduled between June and December 2005. This rapprochement between Asuncion and Washington has occasioned considerable criticism from neighbouring countries and major worry on the part of Bolivian farmers' movements, which fear intervention if Evo Morales wins.

In Peru, the 50,000 farmers of the *Selva Alta* still lag far behind their Bolivian counterparts in matters of organisation, while seeking support and inspiration from them. Potential for instability exists here because many of these farmers were part of the *rondas campesinas*, rural militia set up by the Peruvian military to fight the Shining Path rebels during the 1990s. The *cocaleros* therefore hold a lasting grudge against a state, which used to enlist their help against its Maoist enemy, but which now is eradicating their coca fields and imprisoning their union leaders. The roadblocks and demonstrations periodically organised to protest against eradication are occasions for them to remind the state that they have kept some of the weapons that the state distributed to their militias.

An assessment of the twenty-five years of "war on drugs" in Latin America

Assessment of the situation, twenty-five years and numerous fruitless eradication and alternative development programmes later, shows that the totality of surface area planted with coca on pioneer fronts has seemingly never been greater and farmers living off them never more numerous. Conflict has not come to an end in Colombia, but redoubled its intensity. It has been transformed into a three-sided war, of which at least two sides – the rural guerrilla movements and the paramilitary forces which combat them – finance themselves by 'taxing' coca (and opium poppy) production and cocaine trafficking, where they are not purely and simply their organisers. Today, Colombia is still by far the leading world producer of coca leaves and cocaine. But what about its stability? Recent negotiations between paramilitary forces (i.e. the camp most heavily involved in drug trafficking) and the Uribe government have resulted in the adoption of a so-called 'justice and peace' law, which seeks to demobilise

extreme right-wing militia. This process perhaps marks the beginnings of transition from war economy to peace economy in regions of Colombia most affected by the conflict (including those in the south of the country where most coca is produced), and therefore the advent of some form of stability. But the law appears to ratify the *de facto* political power that paramilitary 'warlords' have built up in some Colombian provinces, and to strengthen their economic power, which is often based upon concentration of property and agrarian revenue, along with trafficking (including cocaine) and predation. It must therefore be admitted that this newfound stability – which may not yet be called 'peace' because the guerrillas have not yet been demobilised (*see above*) – is built upon an impunity granted to small authoritarian regional fiefdoms feeding off an economy based on trafficking and predation. It is uncertain that such a form of 'illegitimate stability' could be politically durable, as it silences but does nothing to resolve the claims that are at the heart of the conflict. Likewise, it is doubtful that the model of 'development' it promotes – exploitation of trafficking profits and predation of natural resources in connection with the world market – is sustainable.

5. Connections between drug production and state stability

Towards a typology of illegal production areas

The countries under study may be numbered among (some, indeed, are) the world's leading producers of agricultural raw materials (opium, coca and cannabis) used in the manufacture of the three families of illegal drugs of natural origin most consumed worldwide: heroin; cocaine and crack; and marijuana and hashish. Although very different from one another, all are among the poorest countries on the planet. Their respective governments are signatories to the major international agreements and treaties on drugs and as such are implementing – according to the means at their disposal – policies combating illegal production in their territories. They are also beneficiaries of bilateral and multilateral aid programmes for the training and equipment of their security forces for anti-drug operations. These countries are therefore part of a worldwide dual transnational network working both for and against illegal drugs: the markets for illegal goods and the military-security complex involved in their suppression.

The countries and regions under consideration may, however, be differentiated by the armed conflicts they suffer or relative social peace they enjoy, their internal stability being more or less affected or prolonged by the recourse of a proportion of their farmers to agricultural production of illegal drugs.

It is clear that, from at least the 1980s, drugs have played crucial roles in these regions, which are marked by agricultural, social, economic and even identity crises that have led to or risk leading to violence or full-blown armed conflict.

But it is also quite clear that this resort to illicit crops has not had the same effect everywhere. In Afghanistan and Burma, opium has become one of the major stakes in civil war as much as a resource for its prolongation. Furthermore, as far as neighbouring states are concerned, production of opiates makes worse regional destabilisation factors already at play because of war.

It is the durability of coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia, and cannabis in Morocco, and thus of the way of life of tens of thousands of families who work there, that is at stake in conflicts where degrees of violence seem to depend at least partially upon the suppression strategies adopted (forcible eradication and alternative crops, respectively).

Finally, in West Africa, recourse to cannabis seems to be an effective response to setbacks essentially to do with land (exhaustion of forest reserves) and ecology (increased soil salinity, desertification, erosion due to human activity, etc.) that threaten a social stability made possible by profitable farming. Ghana, one of the world's leading producers of cocoa, differs from other countries in the region (such as the Ivory Coast and Liberia) in that it has remained free of armed conflict and is governed by a democratic regime. One might think that its cannabis economy may have helped Ghana, like Morocco, to maintain socio-economic and political peace and stability.

In political, economic and even geopolitical terms, agricultural commodities like opium, coca and cannabis weigh heavy in the scales of local negotiation: at first sight, the undoubtedly fragile stability of Afghanistan depends on resources and revenue from opium production. The same goes for coca in Bolivia, but here it is forcible eradication measures that risk causing war to break out. In Peru, negotiations between *cocalero* groups and the government are at a standstill; the main leaders of *cocalero* unions were arrested in 2004 or have gone into hiding, fuelling social (not to say political) conflict, the outcome of which is difficult to forecast at present. In Burma, the junta in power has given tacit authorisation for production and marketing of opium by a number of rebel armies with which it has signed fragile and no more than temporary ceasefires. In Morocco, maintenance of economic and socio-political stability in the largely Berber region of the Rif is also partly due to state tolerance of cannabis cultivation there. Finally, in Ghana, cultivation of cannabis is cushioning the crisis, but the country is also having major problems supporting the single-crop cultivation of cocoa.

Illegal crops are certainly more profitable than local food crops (rice, wheat, barley, maize, potatoes, beans, yams, yucca, etc.) or even other possible cash crops (saffron, hevea, tea , cocoa, coffee, fruit, palm, citrus, etc.), and it is tempting to explain that people resort to them simply due to of economic considerations. But illegal agriculture proliferates above all in contexts of armed conflict (Afghanistan and Burma) or social and political crisis (sub-Saharan Africa, Bolivia, Morocco and Peru). It is not only and certainly not mainly the result of economic problems, but instead thrives in political contexts marked by the use and consequences of force, and by complex power struggles.

Through the interplay of a range of national and international parties and the nature of existing power struggles over territory and illegal cropping, and also because of illegal cropping itself, illegal drug economies have taken on truly geopolitical dimensions in such political and territorially different contexts as those of Central and South-East Asia, Andean America, the Maghreb and West Africa.

Thus, the multiple scenarios brought into play by recourse to a drug economy by parties caught up in conflict and in complex and often transnationalised power struggles might lead to prolongation of conflict, generation of conflict situations or, contrarily, maintenance of relative social peace – all depending on context.

But the contexts and issues at stake in illegal drug economies in the countries at hand are far from being solely geopolitical, and their study requires taking other factors into account. While it is reasonable to assume that the emergence and development of illegal agricultural production on such a scale have clearly been made possible by political-territorial conflict, it goes without saying that the levels of development and the environmental backgrounds of the regions concerned are also determining factors. It follows that the issues at stake in the matter of illegal drugs go far beyond questions of security alone, or at least that they should be viewed as belonging in a wider concept of security that includes, apart from the obvious health aspect, food security and what we call 'environmental security' (we mean this in the ecological sense). Far from being the exclusive province of illegal drug producing states, these latter concepts also have their part to play in international relations.

Effect of the 'war on drugs'

There is one aspect of resort to an illegal drug economy that has not been much addressed although it affects and could even directly compromise the stability of states where illegal agricultural production takes place: the 'war on drugs' initiated by the Nixon administration in the early 70s and that ever since has kept reduction of drug supplies in producing countries as

the main aim of international anti-drug efforts. For the last thirty years, eradication campaigns have been the order of the day across all five continents, whatever the context and despite counter-productive consequences and adverse effects. Alfred McCoy, a long-term observer and analyst of roles played by political illegal drug economies in the international relations game, is adamant about the ineffectiveness of the 'war on drugs' and especially about the fact that it has been seen to be clearly counter-productive. Thirty years of 'war' have accompanied expansion of surface area under coca and opium poppy cultivation and also, judging from the single example of Morocco, under cannabis cultivation. And despite a total estimated cost of US $150 billion, it has not only failed to reduce surface areas dedicated to drug crops and quantities produced, but also expanded and dispersed illegal agriculture worldwide, while doing much to contribute to the militarisation of many areas of production.

6. Development of agricultural drug production and surface areas under cultivation

7. World map of production areas for the three main 'drug plants'

7. Selected bibliography of speakers

AFSAHI, Kenza,

Contributed in 2003 and 2004 to the UNODC reports on cannabis cultivation in Morocco:

2003, UNODC, *Maroc : enquête sur le cannabis 2003*, Vienna, UNODC.

2004, UNODC, *Maroc : enquête sur le cannabis 2004*, Vienna, UNODC.

CHOUVY, Pierre-Arnaud

2005, *Morocco said to produce nearly half of the world's hashish supply*, Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 17 n° 11, November 2005, pp. 32-35.

2005, *The dangers of opium eradication in Asia*, Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 17 n° 1, January 2005, pp. 26-27.

2004, *Drogues illicites, territoires et conflits en Afghanistan et en Birmanie*, Hérodote, n° 112, 1er trimestre 2004, *Géopolitique des drogues illicites*, pp. 84-104.

2004, *Opium ban risks greater insecurity for Wa in Myanmar*, Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 16 n° 2, February 2004, pp. 39-41.

2004, *Drugs and the Financing of Terrorism*, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 2, Issue 20, 21 October 2004, pp. 3-5

2003, *Géopolitiques des drogues illicites en Asie*, Hérodote, n° 109, 2ème trimestre 2003, *Les Etats-Unis et le reste du monde*, pp. 163-189.

2002, *Les territoires de l'opium*, Geneva, Olizane.

CHOUVY, Pierre-Arnaud, LANIEL, Laurent

2004, *De la géopolitique des drogues illicites*, Hérodote, n° 112, 1er trimestre 2004, *Géopolitique des drogues illicites*, pp. 7-26.

GONZÁLEZ, Olga L., LANIEL, Laurent (eds.),

2005, *Drogues et antidrogue en Colombie. Production et trafic illicites, conflit armé, interventions étatiques*, Les Cahiers de la sécurité, n° 59, 4ème trimestre 2005.

LABROUSSE, Alain,

2005, *Afghanistan : opium de guerre, opium de paix*, Paris, Mille et une nuits.

2004, *Géopolitique des drogues*, Que Sais-Je ?, n° 3693, Paris, P.U.F.

2004, *Colombie : le rôle de la drogue dans l'extension territoriale des FARC-EP (1978-2002)*, Hérodote, n° 112, 1er trimestre 2004, *Géopolitique des drogues illicites*, pp. 27-48.

LANIEL, Laurent,

2002, *Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa: The Legacy of War and Apartheid*, in *Globalisation, Drugs and Criminalisation*, Final Research Report, MOST-Drugs Programme, Paris, UNESCO.

2001, *Drugs in Southern Africa: Business as Usual*, International Social Science Journal, N°169, September 2001.

1999, *Cannabis in Lesotho: A Preliminary Survey*, MOST Discussion Papers, N°34, Paris, February 2001.

1998, *Où va la production de cannabis ?*, in *Les drogues en Afrique subsaharienne*, Observatoire géopolitique des drogues, Paris, Karthala.

LANIEL, Laurent, PEREZ, Pascale,

2004, *Croissance et… croissance de l'économie du cannabis en Afrique subsaharienne (1980-2000)*, Hérodote, n° 112, 1er trimestre 2004, *Géopolitique des drogues illicites*, pp. 122-138.

MANSFIELD, David

2005, *Pariah or poverty? The opium ban in the province of Nangarhar in the 2004-2005 growing season and its impacts on rural livelihood strategies*, Project for alternative livelihoods (PAL) in Eastern Afghanistan, GTZ.

2004, *Le développement alternatif en Afghanistan : l'échec du donnant-donnant*, Hérodote, n° 112, 1er trimestre 2004, *Géopolitique des drogues illicites*, pp. 105-121.

2002, *The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality. Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan*, Paper prepared for the International Conference on The Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation, Feldafing/Munich, Germany, January 2002.

MILSOM, Jeremy

2005, *The long hard road out of drugs: the case of the Wa*, in *Trouble in the Triangle. Opium and conflict in Burma*, Jelsma M., Kramer T., Vervest P., 2005, Chiang Mai, Silkworm Books, pp. 61-93.

McCOY, Alfred

2004, *The stimulus of prohibition: a critical history of the global narcotics trade*, in *Dangerous harvests. Drug plants and the transformation of indigenous landscapes*, Steinberg M., Hobbs J. Mathewson K., 2004, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 24-111.

2003, *The Politics of Heroin. CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, Colombia)*, Chicago, Lawrence Hill Books, 709 p.

RAMIREZ, Maria Clemencia,

2001, *Entre el estado y la guerrilla: identidad y ciudadanía en el movimiento de los campesinos cocaleros del Putumayo,* Icanh/Colciencias, Bogotá.

SOBERON GARRIDO, Ricardo,

2005, *Narcotráfico y derechos humanos*, in Cabieses, H. *et al.*, *Hablan los diablos. Amazonía, coca y narcotráfico en el Perú*, MLAL/AbyaYala/TNI, Quito, 2005.

1998, *Perú: El nuevo autoritarismo*, in *Democracias bajo fuego,* Jelsma M., Roncken, T., 1998, Montevideo, Brecha/TNI/Acción Andina, pp.97-118.

Websites:

Campaña coca y soberanía: http://www.cocasoberania.org

DrugStrat: http://laniel.free.fr

Geopium: http://www.geopium.org

Transnational Institute: http://www.tni.org/drugs

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: http://www.unodc.org

CERI: http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/

CNRS: http://www.cnrs.fr/

CPSH: http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/

INHES: http://www.inhes.interieur.gouv.fr/

PRODIG: http://prodig.univ-paris1.fr/umr/