

REPORTING HIM AND HIS CAUSE ARIGHT

Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the Liman von Sanders mission¹

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I

In this paper I shall concern myself, on the basis of a representative example, with the epistemology of the causal relation in history. In so doing, I do not seek to be wholly comprehensive. I intend rather to concentrate upon the exposition and appreciation of the distinct yet related concepts of the Real Cause and the Most Significant Cause, as specific facets of historical causation and motivation - reason for action. Nor do I attempt to deduce an entirely new theory. For the task I set myself is primarily that of criticism and appreciation of such theory as we already have. I shall then try to build up a philosophy of history which might analyze the process of historical causation. In speaking, as I have, of a representative example, it will be most appropriate to place a slice of Ottoman history - the "Young Turk" era, to be more exact - as an object before me, almost palpably, upon the table and dissect it at will. I hope thereby to select the most valid answer to a seemingly simple multiple-choice question: why did the Ottoman "Sad-

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1 Â'zam", Mahmud Şevket Paşa, wish to invite a "prominent German general"²?

In almost all the historical writing there has been a marked tendency to regard the invitation of the German military mission of "Generalleutnant" O.V.K. Liman von Sanders as essentially a military episode, notable in itself much as a foreign military package deal with all its imperialist strings attached would be notable, but of no more permanent importance or particular significance. In essence it has often been assumed that the Liman von Sanders Mission was invited for the sole reason of reorganizing the Ottoman Army - an army defeated, depleted and thus demoralized by the sheer extent of its losses during the opening phase of the Balkan War ("Balkan Harbi"). Indeed, when historians explain Mahmud Şevket Paşa's wish for a "prominent German general" to "reorganize" the Ottoman Army as having been exclusively motivated by his desire for reorganization, they are only justified in assuming such a desire as the norm and they feel no need to investigate from a different perspective : that, they would say, is not the business of philosophy of history, for, they would argue with Lukacs, "the historian must not meddle with unexpressed motives"³ of the agent. Now this attitude is wrong in my opinion, simply because such "meddling" will indubitably reveal that the Paşa's motive was far more sophisticated than is commonly supposed, and that the motive of reorganization of the Army which sounds plausible enough on first hearing proves on examination to have a much more elaborate plot. Strictly speaking, the only reason why what I have just said escapes being a platitude is that, in providing explanation for Mahmud Şevket Paşa's reasoning only, historians have necessarily forged a reasoning of their own or, at best, taken the "re-enactment" of the process of the Paşa's thinking for granted. As Collingwood⁴ would have said, having ascertained the facts as best they could, they thought there was no further process of inquiring into their causes. They knew what Mahmud Şevket Paşa asked from Baron von Wangenheim, the German Ambassador at Istanbul ; then, they thought they already knew why he asked. The point is that, to the best of my knowledge, no historian ever questioned the Paşa himself about his motive for inviting a German military mission. Still, one would have thought that that should not

² It appears that Mahmud Şevket Paşa put forward this proposal at a Cabinet meeting, for the first time, on 2 March 1913 (17 Şubat 1329). "Sadriâzam" Mahmud Şevket Paşa 'nin günlük not defteri", *Hayat*, Sayı 1-31 (1 Ocak 1965-29 Temmuz 1965) ; [Hereinafter, "Not defteri"]; Sa.5 (28 Ocak 1965). Entry for 2 March 1913.

³ J. Lukacs, *Historical consciousness or the remembered past*, New York: Harper & Row, 1968, p. 164.

⁴ R.G. Collingwood, *The idea of history*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 214.

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have debarred the historians from assessing what this motive was ; as a matter of fact it did not. After all, even had they questioned the Paşa he might well have concealed his motive ; and why not ? That the reorganization of the Ottoman Army with German assistance is the obvious aspect on which the Liman von Sanders Mission has been brought to the attention of scholars cannot, I think, be the explanation of its Most significant Cause - that cause most responsible, on the basis of analysis, for the intended result, regardless of what the actual result might be. I should regard it rather as a manifestation of historians' points of view and their predisposition towards wishful explanations. This is no way to reach the final destination : to reconstruct and explain the inviting of the Liman von Sanders Mission as Mahmud Şevket Paşa conceived it, to establish its historical causation accordingly, and to juxtapose the two concurrently. This sentence, which contains the gist of my whole thesis, I shall presently have amplified at some length, for to do so is to discuss the process of historical inking : a thinking which would secure the conceptual connection between our understanding of Mahmud Şevket Paşa 's inviting a "prominent German general" and our discerning its "rationale"⁵. But this is not enough. I am persuaded that much of the same must be true for the historian. To put the whole matter in another way, what I maintain is that the reason for this inviting of a "prominent German general" should also make perfectly good sense from the historian's point of view - even though he may not approve of its moral sense. The agent's Real Cause must not be his own prime mover only, it must move the historian too. The practical value of this generalization is this : I do not suppose, nor indeed do I support any such position, that my Most Significant Cause will render nugatory other probable causes that help to explain the invitation of a "prominent German general". Yet the generalization I have posited determines the event accurately because it is the sole cause that juxtaposes the agent's reasoning concurrently with that of the historian. This progression, I might add, has nothing to do with the total development of history ; it has a lot to do, however, with a theory of the relative importance of the causal factor in history.

II

At this point, therefore, I propose to put forward a hypothesis along "political" lines ; one which, if correct, would indicate that there is the

⁵ W. Dray, "The historical explanation of actions reconsidered", pp. 66-89 in P. Gardiner (ed.), *The philosophy of history*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 69.

closest imaginable collateral relationship between Mahmud Şevket Paşa's desiring to invite a "prominent German general" on the one hand, and his aspiring to control the partisan political activities of the Ottoman officer corps, explicitly, on the other. My view is that such a connection between a well-established historical fact and the factor not in the least recognized yet to be the most relevant is brought about by the same motive ; in what chronological relation they stand to each other is another question altogether - and the answer is immaterial as far as the present argument is concerned.

The motive, according to this view, was Mahmud Şevket Paşa's Real Cause - the one he did avow when to do so entailed no adverse consequences to himself, unless, of course, he had completely deceived himself. It was to control the military's partisan political activities - and control them explicitly. And that his Real Cause is my Most Significant Cause can, in addition, be justified perfectly by reference to the documentary evidence ; and, I stress, the justification requires no particular reference to the whole gamut of Ottoman-German relations. For the aspect of significance is indicative of the fact that Mahmud Şevket Paşa's Real Cause is not enough to describe the past ; it is expressive only in the context of this German military assistance to the Ottomans. So it may not even be important after all, yet it remains significant.

By way of conclusion, I willingly borrow from Stretton⁶ and say that I cannot reconstruct Mahmud Şevket Paşa's reasoning, nor can I test his own account for truth, nor appraise his motive without the best possible understanding of his situation - the very object, surely, of the study of history. To this, then, I now turn.

III

In a previous study⁷ I have already attempted to indicate the extent to which the Ottoman officer corps regarded the military institution as the sole and true custodian of the interests of the state. It was a corollary that the officer corps should proceed further and assume that soldiers were also

⁶ H. Stretton, *The political sciences : general principles of selection in social science and history*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 19.

⁷ M. N. Turfan, *The politics of military politics : civil-military relations in the Ottoman Empire with special reference to the "Young Turk" era*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1983, [Hereinafter, M.N. Turfan, *The politics of military politics*], esp. Ch.3.

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better than civilians at determining the policies which would best serve those interests. There was, however, a significant paradox in the position of the military : the longer the military struggled for the preservation of the state, the further apart it drew from the civilians and yet the nearer it came to acting the role of a political ruling group - in the form of holding the political initiative. Indeed, whenever the military took a conscious stand against the civilians, the politicians, it became ipso facto a formidable political power in the hands of its leaders whose chief political asset was always their claim to be "above politics". Moreover, as long as the military saw itself both as an integral and as the most powerful element in the social cosmos, any notion of ambiguity concerning its role as the political ruling group could hardly occur to it. Inevitably, the officer corps regarded their role as a perfectly natural one. The role concept is important here because it makes visible the social framework within which the officer corps became involved in political issues. As these issues became more acute and far-reaching and dominated every aspect of the society, so the role of the military was automatically extended. Here, the role concept illuminates, as it were, the officer corps as well as the Ottoman military system within which they acted. Nevertheless, the individual officer subordinated himself to the perceived needs of his vocation - a vocation sanctioned by his uniform. His individuality had transcended into a trans-individual reality through which the awareness of individuality had, by 1913, been increased. The conscious political acts of the military consequently became accelerated and moved from the previous interventionist role to the ruling group role.

The coup d'état of 23 January 1913 ("Bab-i Âli Baskını" - "The Raid of the Sublime Porte"), displacing the Kâmil Paşa Government, was, as the following developments were to prove, a prologue establishing the military as the political ruling group. In this capacity the officers were actively engaged in making major policy decisions and in cooperating, but on their own terms, with the politicians. Evidently, although the officers became the de facto executive, their amalgamation with the Committee of Union and Progress ("İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti") has been the cause of a general misapprehension that the officers overthrew the Government of Kâmil Paşa merely to reinstate the Unionist politicians in his stead. The successful staging of the coup, resulting from the role-expansion of the military, was made possible mainly because of the operational orientation of the military, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Unionists' belief that the military had the ability to handle it speedily and efficiently. The process fed upon itself. A task, in this case domestic, needed to be accomplished. The military had the manpower and the resources available and was thus the natural candidate

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for its completion. Given the tank, the military had to build up expertise in order to accomplish it. This, however, it had already done. Evidently, once the military had completed its task it was, as the civilians were to realize, more effective to leave the military to enlarge their operational sphere than to hand the task over to another organization, a political party, which would have been more appropriate constitutionally. The military in this fashion became the logical candidate for the accomplishment of new tasks in related fields as the need arose. And since such tasks had become increasingly political, the military inexorably gained operational political expertise, having already acquired political attitudes. This process, furthermore, seemed to be irreversible because of the way in which the goals, values and organization of, especially, Unionist opinions were reflected in the officer corps. One must not neglect this consideration. Nor, indeed, did the Unionist politicians. They realized that in the existing political realities of the day, no other course of action but cooperation was viable for them if they wanted to have a share in the governance of the state. In fact, all they did was to manage to capture the ethical momentum, so to speak, and to build up a monopoly of zeal. They appear to have believed it to be unjust that isolated groups of civilians could not introduce the changes which they had at heart. The military offered these the necessary instrument at the cost of submission to the military's protective power. As social psychologists would have argued, for instance, much of their conspiratorial behaviour could be traced to frustrated personal ambitions in terms of upward mobility into the Establishment. At this point, the close connection between the normative and the utilitarian interests reasserted itself. The point is, of course, that overthrowing the Government was a means to an end. It involved mainly two judgements - that the end was "good" and that military action was the "only way" to achieve it.

Here, it may be advanced as a plausible historical hypothesis that events of this nature are usually affected, or even determined, by chance combinations of circumstances, whereas the broad and gradual transformations in soldiers' ideas, beliefs and aspirations are essentially independent of momentary accidents. Such a hypothesis is necessary to account for the events *which* were to follow. These events were closely linked with the political conceptions of the military - that is, "politics" dominated in the society, but it was politics based on military power, so that those who held this power determined policies and thus dominated the society as well. From 1913 onwards, this exalted image of the military persisted - it was not an image which appeared suddenly with "the Raid on the Sublime Porte", but was firmly rooted in the Turkish military tradition.

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Moreover, as the new "Sadr-ı Â'zam" and Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, was to admit, the politicians were continually reminded and informed of this image.

Yet the apparently homogeneous, monolithic nature of the military evoked by an image of this kind is not entirely appropriate. The officers were exposed to, indeed involved in, the rampant ideological divisions of a ramshackle Empire. For in the circumstances in which that Empire found itself in 1913 tensions between, especially, the "Young Turkists", nurtured mostly on Ziya Gökalp's "nationalistic" philosophy, and the "Old Ottomanists", epitomized perhaps by such a man as Mahmud Şevket Paşa, would recur naturally. The more conscious the "Turkists", the more convinced they were of the importance of their political function within the Empire as Ottomanism tended increasingly to be equated with Turkish nationalism of a strongly Islamic kind. For Gökalp, those holding the reins of imperial power ought to be Turks or, at least, ought to consider themselves Turks and be proud of their Turkishness - the nation was the ultimate reality.

And for the predominantly Muslim-Turkish "young" officers of the period who felt themselves morally responsible for the country's destiny, the more this responsibility was imposed upon them, in Gökalp's ideological format, the higher the value they placed upon their political function. So they became anxious to discharge it at every opportunity and thereby tended to lay claim to excessive recognition for their function within the overall structure of the society.

There is, to my mind, little doubt that the "young" officers' social function, namely that which established them at the apex of the social hierarchy, was determined by a consensus. This was a tacit agreement which derived from the conditions of Ottoman society in 1913. Two factors may be said to have perpetuated this situation. The first was the gradually evolved bond between the social "order", based on this tacit agreement, and the Ottoman-Turkish intellectual formation that lent it rational justification. Secondly and I think more importantly, such justification in the long run induced a habit of mind which made it increasingly difficult to conceive of any other social "order". This was mainly due to the powerful motive for accepting that there was a national interest in the general adherence to an overall vision of politics and in the commitment of the officer corps in getting this idea to prevail.

Nevertheless, by April 1913, one symptom of the response in the political thinking of the "old Ottomanist" to the challenge of the "young Turkist" could quite accurately be discerned in the manner in which the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" appears to have contemplated the notion of contradictions in his relations with the officer corps. In these relations, increasingly imbued with ideological differences, he sought to be in control of the corps while the corps, in its turn, sought control over Government policy and, in fact, had achieved this on almost all occasions. Yet the Paşa must have realized that they could not both be in control in the same matters, although they over might succeed in achieving parity with each. In justification of this kind of reasoning, analogous to the Aristotelian logic of "contradictory proposition", must have lain the "Sadr-ı Â'zam"'s realization that political methods not law would be the effective way of controlling the military's partisan political activities. Past experiences had proved that in successive Governments' attempts to apply legal restraints, such as a penal code and administrative regulations, or even normative restraints, as in the development of a military code of conduct, the military, particularly in times of domestic and international crisis, were able to anticipate and evade the moves of the Governments. Secondly, there was the realization, also based on past experiences, that the prospect for any worthwhile control by Governments would be bleak indeed if it depended on "specific" actions, such as forbidding the military to join political parties, to vote or to stand as candidates. Finally, control by means of implicit actions, through a common ideology, presented still more intractable problems. Such control was indeed impossible; a common ideology did not exist in the first place because of fundamental disagreement as to the best methods of ensuring the survival of the Ottoman state. But for the Government, one other avenue still seemed to be open ; namely, explicit actions, through which the officer corps might be penetrated. In so doing, the officer corps' loyalty to the Government could, to a great extent, be secured and thus parity between the Government and the corps be achieved.

If, starting from this point, we go on to inquiry how and with whom this concern for the politics of controlling the military's partisan political activities was conceived, we find some very revealing information. Only then is it possible to apprehend reason and order in events which appear not to have possessed any. Their significance, in spite of the main facts being familiar, has never been appreciated. According to the level of generality upon which I am assessing Mahmud Şevket Paşa, the reason and order may be understood, if I may reiterate my hypothesis, in the phrase that the "Sadr-ı Â'zam"'s Real Cause, in his wish to invite a "prominent German general" to

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"reorganize" the Ottoman Army, was his prevailing aspiration to establish explicit control over the officer corps.

The bringing of foreign officers as advisers, instructors and reformers had precedents in earlier times and in most respects - for example, after a major military setback - and on each occasion the procedure tended to follow the same pattern. However, in the period now under review, the idea of inviting a new military mission from abroad was fundamentally the expression of political concern for the establishment and maintenance of governmental control over the officer corps. All the more so, if one considers that following the military reverses in the Balkans the existing "...German military mission ... had fallen to its lowest level of value and influence"⁸. Yet it is not essential for our purpose to establish whether the wish expressed by Mahmud Şevket Paşa to invite, once again, a "prominent German general" was justified on technical grounds; the main concern here is to trace his predominant motive behind the policy of seeking German military assistance.

It is worth dwelling a little on the circumstances which made the recurrence of the issue of German military assistance significant. The decision is explicable on several grounds but it was by no means inevitable. For example, a report by the German Ambassador, dated 5 January 1913, may help us to peer into the minds of Ottoman statesmen and may illustrate my point. Three days previously, during talks between the German Ambassador and the Ottoman Foreign Minister, the latter, Noradungian (Noradounghian) Efendi, had inquired about the conditions of employment of the French General Eydoux, then attached to the Greek armed forces. The Foreign Minister had wanted to be told, ver confidentially, in exactly what position the French General was employed⁹. As Bayur has observed :

"This wish did not seem as though it were aimed merely at finding out; but it indicated that, in inquiring about General Eydoux's

⁸ G.W. Swanson, "War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid II to 1913 : Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission", pp. 367-385 in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds.), *War, technology and society in the Middle East*, London, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 378.

⁹ *Wangenheim am das Auswärtige Ami*, Nr.3, Konstantinopel, 2 Januar 1913, in J. Lepsius, A.M. Bartholdy, F. Thimme (eds), *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914 : Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes*, Berlin, Deut Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte mbH., 1922-1927. 40 Band. [Hereinafter *G.P.*]; 38. Band, Nr.15435, pp. 193-194. General Eydoux was the head of the French military mission in Greece from its inception in February 1911. See : *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

conditions of employment, the intention of the Ottoman Government was to invite a military mission accordingly and, judging by the inquiry being made of the German Ambassador, that the thought of bringing an officer from Germany had been entertained"¹⁰.

¹⁰ Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbi tarihi*. Cilt II, Kısım 3. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII. Seri-Sayı 14a. Ankara : T.T.K. Basimevi, 1951 ; [Hereinafter, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbi tarihi*, II/3] ; p. 276.

As Bayur also makes clear, there does not seem to exist in the Ottoman archives any document which supports this contention (*Ibid.*, loc. cit.). Such an absence may partially be explicable on two grounds. First, given the prevailing temper of the previous Kâmil Paşa Cabinet, "... among whose members incompatibility was evident", + it is possible to believe that Noradungyan Efendi was conducting his talk with Wangenheim, the German Ambassador, of his own accord and did not feel it necessary to document it afterwards. Secondly, and I think rather more significantly, he may have deliberately wanted to keep it quiet from the then Minister of War and later also Deputy Commander-in-Chief, General Nâzım Paşa, in view of the latter's stand against the employment of foreign officers. For example, when Nâzım Paşa took office, the British Military Attaché expressed his doubts about even the continued employment of five German instructors remaining from the original twenty-four in the Ottoman service under General von der Goltz. He reported that Nâzım Paşa was known for his opposition to the payment of large salaries to foreign instructors ++. As for the German response to Nâzım Paşa's position, I quote, uncritically, from Swanson, who based his comments on evidence found in *Auswärtiges Amt Archiv* (Bonn) [referred to as A.A.].

"The German Ambassador to Turkey, Wangenheim, was worried. Nazim was unsympathetic and acted on several occasions in a curt, impolite manner which led the German ambassador and officers to assume that Nazim was hostile to the mission and that he might possibly be thinking of turning to another country ... Reappraisal of Nazim indicated that he was critical of Germany for its attitude during the war with Italy and for its support of the C[ommittee] U[nion and] P[rogress]. But the Germanophobia of Nazim did not manifest itself directly in military affairs. As a soldier, Nazim was a nationalist who believed in the superiority of the Turkish soldier and saw no reason for having foreigners to train Ottoman troops. Therefore Wangenheim believed that Nazim was working towards reducing the number of German officers holding command over Turkish soldiers without contemplating the summoning of officers from other countries" +++

+ A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, II. Seri-Sayı 15. 2nci basılış. Ankara: T.T.K. Basimevi, 1951, p. 77.

++ Tyrrell to Marling, Tel. N°. 64, Conf. Constantinople, 21 September 1912, *British Foreign Office documents*, Public Record Office, London [Hereinafter, *F.O.*] 195/2430.

+++ G.W. Swanson, *War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid to 1913 . Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*, p. 380. For his evidence, see : *Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg*, n° 282, Therapia, 28 August 1912, A.A., Türkei 142, N° A 15123.

Also see : J.L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe : die preussisch-deutschen Militärmissionen in der Türkei, 1835-1919*. Düsseldorf : Droste Verlag, 1976; esp. pp. 112-125, who produces more evidence, in a similar vein, from the German point of view.

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A similar idea, indeed, was entertained by Wangenheim on 5 January in his telegram (supplementary to that of the 2nd). He expounded on the reasons for being asked about the Powers of General Eydoux in the following words:

"The Porte is considering a request for a German general to act as a supreme commander in peacetime, a major purpose being to keep the Turkish army out of politics"¹¹.

In a further despatch, dated 21 January,

"Wangenheim was able to report a general feeling in ruling circles favouring requests to foreign governments for aid in reforming the Ottoman Empire. Without specifying who wanted it, he continued that one man hoped the Kaiser would place at Turkey's disposal *a German general, who, aided by German officers, would reorganize the army*"¹².

A "... general feeling in ruling circles ..." was important, no doubt, and made the reasoning of Wangenheim plausible, but nowhere in his report was the Ambassador able to refer to a person or persons in "ruling circles" as his source. Nor was he able to specify whom exactly he meant by "ruling circles". However, the underlying assumption nurtured in his reports is that of the Great Powers' concern for their own national interests. It was this philosophy of self-interest which was so dextrously harnessed by, for example, Germany against the crumbling Ottoman Empire, through a military-political alliance. Here, the significance of the last-quoted report lies precisely in that its author seems to have had an incipient idea of the actual "ruling circles". These had to be manipulated if the desired changes were to come about in all the areas affected by the alliance. It was in the preparation of the soil for the reception of their aims that the manifestation by the Great Powers of "... aid in reforming the Ottoman Empire" became politically and historically significant. If it were not so, it would be hard to explain why the foreign aspect of the anxiety about "reorganization" of the Army should

¹¹ "... weil sie erwägt, deutschen General als Oberkommandierenden im Frieden zu erbitten, hauptsächlich um die Armee ausserhalb der Politik zu stellen" In : *G.P.*, 38. Band, N° 15435, p. 193, Note.

¹² G.W. Swanson, *War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid to 1913*. Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission, p. 382. (Emphasis is mine). The full report is found in: *G.P.*, 38. Band, n° 15435, pp. 193-195, Note. Here I have deliberately quoted from Swanson's précis instead of directly from the report. In doing so, I hope to see the events in their proper perspective without exaggerating or neglecting one particular aspect.

coincide with the native aspect about "control" of it. One suspects, therefore, that behind the concern about the "reorganization" was another, less tangible but equally real, anxiety. Indeed, Wangenheim himself, whose contacts with the actual "ruling circles", the officer corps, were presumably few, seems not to have taken much cognizance at first of what was occurring with regard to those "circles". More importantly, as I have asserted, neither has the real anxiety of Mahmud Şevket Paşa attracted the attention of scholars. In short, the need to "reorganize" the military institution, specifically the Army, and the desire to being a "prominent German general" to do the job appear to have been conflated.

I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am not suggesting that the issue of foreign military assistance, as we see it, was clear to all the contemporaries concerned, still less that the possibilities it provided were weighted in favour of what was to happen, least of all that what was to happen was the only possibility. The more a historical theme, such as that the German Military Mission, is concerned with abstractions, the more the study of it must depend upon direct and critically detached observation.

Following this line of approach, we shall see that the Ottoman Army had been "reorganized", in the true meaning of the word, exactly ten months before the arrival of the German Military Mission on 14 December 1913 - initially a group of ten officers, headed by "Generalleutnant" O.V.K. Liman von Sanders (promoted a month later to "General der Kavallerie"), which became known in foreign literature as "the Liman von Sanders Mission" and designated in Ottoman military parlance as "Alman Hey'et-i Islahiyye-i Askeriyyesi" (German Delegation for Military Improvement).

In truth, it was as early as 14 February 1913 (1 Subat 1329) that "the Regulation for the General Military Organization" ("Teşkilat-ı Umumiye-i Askeriyye Nizamnâmesi") was distributed as "top secret" to the Ottoman Army¹³. It had been prepared jointly by the Ministry of War and the General Staff. The Regulation was then officially confirmed by the Council of Ministers and ratified by the Sultan.

As an example of the magnitude of the changes engendered by this "reorganization" scheme, affecting all facets of the military from the recruitment of personnel to the regional distribution of units, before the

¹³ S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhli kuvvetleri tarihi*. IIIüncü Cilt, 6ıncı Kısım, İinci Kitap. T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Resmî Yayınları Seri n° 2. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1971 ; [Hereinafter, S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhli kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1], p. 199.

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arrival of the Liman von Sanders Mission, let me take those changes applying to the land forces. These were to be composed of four Army Inspectorates, 7th Independent Army Corps (Yemen), 21st Independent Division (Asir) and 22nd Independent Division (Hicaz). First Army Inspectorate (H.Q. Istanbul) was to consist of five Army Corps ; Second Army Inspectorate (H.Q. Adana) of two Army Corps ; Third Army Inspectorate (H.Q. Erzincan) of three Army Corps ; and Fourth Army Inspectorate (H.Q. Bagdad) of two Army Corps. Thus, the whole Ottoman Army appeared, on paper, as consisting of a total of twelve Army Corps, one Independent Army Corps and two Independent Infantry Divisions, all attached directly to the Ministry of War, with the exception of 22nd Independent Division which was attached to the Second Army Inspectorate. In addition, the Regulation proposed the formation of two new Infantry Divisions (23rd and 24th), making a peacetime force of a grand total of thirty-eight Divisions¹⁴. A second example relating to the "reorganization" was a consideration of what could be done to improve the appearance and uniformity of the soldiery so that they might fit the needs of the new structure. On 23 February 1913 (10 Şubat 1329), the first major addition in the "Service Dress and Uniform Regulation" ("Elbise-i Askeriyye Nizamnâmesi") of 18 June 1909 came into force¹⁵. The Ministry of War made a change in the Regulation by which, for instance, all the officer ranks were to wear only one kind of "hâki" (khaki) dress ; they must also wear, at all times, the "hâki"-coloured "kalpak" (headgear made of astrakhan lambskin). The latter step, with its stress on uniformity, was characteristic in that it combined "reorganizational" and strictly military advantages. But it was also significant in being one of the most physically obvious and politically controversial. As a German officer observed, before the change in the Regulation, the wearing of the "hâki" "kalpak" was prominent among those officers whose allegiance lay with the Unionists, while anti-Unionist officers favoured the black "kalpak"¹⁶. The deep divisions thus represented

¹⁴ Full details of "The Distribution of Forces" by the Regulation of 14 February 1913 are found in a document in the *Askerî Müze* (Military Museum), Istanbul, Belge 5612. See : S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhli kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 200-219 and ["Kurulus" -12, -13, -14, -15 and -16] provided between p. 200 and p. 201. Cf. C. Akbay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk harbi*, Cilt I. T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Resmî Yayınları Seri n° 3. Ankara : Gnkur. Basımevi, 1970, pp. 163-165 and "Kurulus" -1, provided between p. 168 and p. 169.

¹⁵ For details, see : S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhli kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6 1, pp. 368-376. The first military dress regulations of the second Constitutional period, the "İrade-i Seniye", is found in : *Basbakanlık Arsivi*, Istanbul [Hereinafter B.A.], Hazine Evrak, n° 108, 5 Haziran 1325.

¹⁶ Extensively quoted from a document. See : *von Lossow to Kriegsministerium*, Darbogas, 2 April 1913, A.A., Türkei 203, N°A11098, in: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire : a study of war and revolution during the Young Turk period.*

among the highly politicized officers had impaired the hierarchical cohesion of the corps and been responsible for the disastrous diminution of the military's fighting quality during the War. It was therefore in the interest of efficiency and uniformity that the wearing of the "hâki" "kalpak", with its implicit ideological symbolism, was made obligatory exactly one month after "the Raid on the Porte" (23 January 1913).

But to any observant mind, it was manifest that an organizational change of far deeper and wider scale than any "re-formation" and "re-outfitting" of the forces was impending. And this constitutes a third example. The concerted feeling of growing "militaristic nationalism" after the loss of the strategic and much revered old imperial capital of Edirne in March 1913 was to make itself all the more visible, and the military's ruling group role all the more prominent, as conditions became favourable for its complete realization. A most timely evocation of this was a Staff-Major's assertion, in a Conference to the Commanders and officers of the I st Division during the Winter Term of 1913, that

"The Turkish nation today, more than ever before, is in need of protection and guarding. The procuring of the conditions of her life and the conditions of her existence [was], in the first place, entrusted to us, the soldiers"¹⁷.

To return to the impending organizational change, it was, in fact, on 10 December 1913, four days before the Liman von Sanders Mission arrived in Istanbul¹⁸, that the General Staff was to put into effect, on its own initiative, the appointment of the Commanders of all thirteen of the Corps and two of the Independent Divisions to their new posts, which were all subsequently located in accordance with the "reorganization" carried out by the 14 February Regulation¹⁹. Nearly a month later, an imperial "irade"²⁰ (7 January

Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Indiana University, 1970, p. 228. Cf. S. Kartamu, *Türk silâhli kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6 1 p. 81, with a more personal observation in C. Kutay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Teskilat-i Mahsusa ve Hayber'de Türk cengi*. Istanbul, Ercan Matbaasi, 1962, p. 26.

¹⁷ Mehmed Nuri, *Birinci Firka Erkân-i Harbi Binbasi : Zabıt ve Kumandan* [Istanbul] : Tanin Matbaasi, 1330. Reprinted as : *Zabıt ve Kumandan : Nuri Conker*. Ankara: Dogus Ltd. Sirketi Matbaasi, 1959, p. 24.

¹⁸ S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhli kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6- 1, p. 195.

¹⁹ The "reorganization", distributed as "top secret" in February, was officially announced by an "Irade-i Seniye" on 11 December 1913. *B.A.*, Hazine Evrak, N° 122, 28 Teşrinisani 1329. See : S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhli kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, p. 196, for the names and ranks of the fifteen commanders.

²⁰ "Irade-i Seniye", 24 Kanunuevvel 1329 (7 January 1914). *B.A.*, Hazine Evrak, n°172. Cf., *Mallet to Grey*, Tel. N°15, Constantinople, 8 January 1914, *B.D.*, X/I, N°464, pp. 414-415.

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1914) was to promulgate all these appointments, including the names of officers appointed to the command of the four Army Inspectorates, Army Corps, Divisions and recruiting zones. Moreover, the "irade" was to contain certain changes in relation to the General Staff and the direction of the Army. Lastly, but no less importantly, the "irade" was to provide a comprehensive list of officers of the ranks of General and Colonel to be placed on the retired list. Most of these, some two hundred and eighty, were, as one source has stated, "... the Commanders responsible for the dreary series of defeats in Macedonia, along with most generals over fifty-five"²¹.

Having commented on the "irade" in a report a few days later, the British Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe-Owen, added

"... as a general conclusion that, whatever may be the side issues involved in these very drastic changes, Enver's first aim in my opinion is to strive for the efficiency of the army"²².

This document is worth quoting, because I find it exemplifies an unclear and even confused appreciation of the momentary disappearance of the military and political tensions which had previously been increasing and coming more to the fore, and which needed strongly purgative attention. Had the Military Attaché been pondering over and perceiving the significance of the "side issues", he would presumably have formed a different opinion regarding the priorities of the aims of "Enver" ; the famous Unionist officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey, had become, by the time the despatch was drafted, Brigadier General Enver Paşa, the Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff, aged thirty-four²³ - the youngest serving officer to be

²¹ Quoted in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks : the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish politics (1908-1914)*. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1969, p. 146 ; apparently based on the information supplied by D.A. Rustow "...from a draft on the Young Turks", *Ibid.*, p. 146, F.N.2. For the figure, see : "Irade-i Seniye", 24 Kanunuevvel 1329 (7 January 1914).

²² "Changes in military command", *Cunliffe-Owen to Mallet*, N°116, Conf. Constantinople, 12 January 1914, *F.O.*, 195/2456/60. This report may also be used as a complement to the list of appointees of 10 December, as given in F.N. 18 above, especially in view of the commanders of the four Army Inspectorates, although it misses those of the two Independent Divisions.

²³ It is generally held that Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey (b.1880 [1295]) was promoted to Colonel on 15 December 1913 (2 Kanunuevvel 1329). Then, on 3 January 1914 (21 Kanunuevvel 1329), Colonel Enver Bey was once more promoted, thus becoming Brigadier-General Enver Paşa, and was, on the same day, appointed Minister of War in the Said Halim Paşa Cabinet. On 8 January 1914, Enver Paşa became Chief of the General Staff by a definitive appointment, in addition to his duties as Minister of War. See : "Enver Paşa'nin resmî sicil özeti", *Cilt III*, pp. 693-694 in S.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*. Istanbul : Remzi Kitabevi, 1971-1972. 3 cilt. Also see : B.A., *Hazine Evrak : Harbiye Istizan Defteri*, N°2777.

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appointed Chief of the General Staff and, more significantly, Minister of War in the Empire since the records of "Serasker"s (later Ministers of War) began in 1826.

All these "very drastic changes" made possible something which only a few clear-sighted prophets, such as Mahmud Şevket Paşa and Baron von Wangenheim, had foreseen might be necessary, and even fewer, such as Enver Paşa, had believed would be feasible : the control of the military as a prerequisite to the restoration of governmental power. In attempting to apply this fundamental tenet of Ottoman state practice, there appears to have been background knowledge that there could be no increase in the fighting efficiency of the military without first obtaining control over it. The political interpretation of this knowledge further entailed an equally important corollary : he who could command the officer corps could control them. It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of these two contentions. For they involved the essential difference in thinking between the two Ministers of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa and Enver Paşa, and further determined their respective attitudes towards the Liman von Sanders Mission. Yet it seems to me that the intention of Mahmud Şevket Paşa was not so much to make changes in Ottoman society as to re-orient and influence minds, especially the minds of those most influential in the society. He could do this by the control of military training and education through a third party - a "prominent German general". In taking this explicit action, he would then be able to enjoy the plenitude of governmental power. Momentarily, indeed, more or less adequate restraints upon the officer corps might be contrived, but the expectation of generally and permanently workable results was to be prevented by his constant neglect of the vitiating effects of his inability to command the officer corps. In the circumstances of 1913, the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" and Minister of War Mahmud Şevket Paşa was not the same General Mahmud Şevket Paşa of 1909 - the popular "Commander of the 'victorious' Action Army in Istanbul and Inspector-General of the First and Second Armies". Nor was he ideologically suited, especially after the loss of Edirne, to the aspirations of the "young" officers who, as implied earlier, comprised the core of the actual "ruling circles".

On the other hand, by 1914, one of the former and no less, possibly even more, popular officers of the "Action Army", Staff-Major Enver Bey, had become head of the "ruling circles" as both Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff - Brigadier-General Enver Paşa. For the first time since 1908, the military command was to knit together under the leadership of Enver Paşa, following those "very drastic changes". Then, as the most

prominent member of the "ruling circles", Enver Paşa was intimately related to the military institution and control of the military's partisan political activities was fully realized under him²⁴. Thus the military institution tended more and more to play its role as a political instrument at the behest of Enver Paşa, not of Government ; so that although Enver Paşa extirpated the partisan political activities of the officer corps he did not, nor did he seek to, displace the institution under his control from "politics". Now, paradoxical though it may appear at first glance, Enver Paşa's control of the military's partisan political activities was obviously the most important issue and not a "side issue" involved in those "very drastic changes". It was an end which was to be reached by means of those "changes" and could be justified by the "young" officers as being a prerogative of supreme political power and professional privilege. It was, in other words, to be a voluntary restraint, induced of their own accord and on their own terms. It is this aspect which is depicted, as a generalization in the literature of the military politics of the so-called "developing nations", as "the politics of wanting to be above politics"²⁵.

Here, it is opportune to digress in order to examine this tendency, regardless of the classification of nations, and to consider with perhaps exaggerated scepticism the arguments of those scholars who take the view of "above politics" being "out of (i.e., above) politics", either by inclination or as a practical principle. Whatever the motives, it seems to me that an ambiguity arises from the employment of the term "politics" only in a narrow sense which links it indissolubly with governmental organization. For there could be a disadvantage in associating "politics" exclusively with such an organization, simply because the effect of this is to dissociate the term "politics" from other forms of organization, such as the military, or modes of its expression, such as "wanting to be above politics". Another effect is not to see the crucial difference between -society and the

²⁴ For the confines of this paper, it may suffice to quote the comments of the then Staff-Major Ismet Bey, an associate (he was Deputy-Chief, Training and Education Section [IIIrd Section], of the newly organized General Staff, as of January 1914) and personal friend of Enver Paşa, who provides one of the best appreciations on "Enver Paşa's high virtues and defects", under the said heading : "Enver Paşa's becoming the Minister of War at his young age was not regarded as odd among the military, [but] was extremely well received ... As the Minister War, [he] immediately, with a clearing-up operation, undertook the reforming of the military. This initiative was really successful. Enver Paşa, having done this clearing up, devoted all his strength to removing the military from partisan politics". I. İnönü, *Hâtıralarım : genç subaylık yıllarım (1884-1918)* (Hazırlayan) S. Selek. İstanbul : Burçak Yayınları, 1969 ; p. 219 ; and also I. İnönü, "İstiklâl Savaşı ve Lozan", *Belleten*, XXXVIII : 149 (Ocak) 1974, pp. 1-30, p. 5.

²⁵ M. Janowitz, *Military institutions and coercion in the developing nations*. (Expanded edition of *The military in the political development of new nations*, published in 1964). Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1977 ; p. 141 (p. 65 in the 1964 edition).

governmental organization nor, again, to consider that "politics" will form an aspect of all social activity including the governmental variety. Suppose we see "wanting" as the operative word to be used by the Enver Paşa of 1914, intending, broadly, to get the officer corps to do what he wants them to do, for example, "to be above politics". The the doings of the officer corps and the means used by Enver Paşa to influence them will, indeed, constitute 'politics" by definition and his and the officer corps' thoughts and acts be called "political". Moreover, Enver Paşa's "politics of wanting to be above politics" will conform with a political formula, solely prescribed in order to show the difference between partisan politics and political ruling group politics - the "politics" of "imperium in imperio".

These reflections raise problems affecting the theory of military politics which, here, might almost be reduced to one : what is the implication of the rapid rise to prominence by the "young" officers in the process of shaping the body politic ? A theory based on the suppositions of he military being "in politics", "out of politics" or even "above politics" may seem to give suggestions but it cannot answer this question. Moreover, the Ottoman state and its military, in all their various stages, did not deliberately conform to patterns of hypothetical statecraft. They were rather the outcome f their own experience. Our question, therefore, cannot be answered without reference to the changes resulting from the interplay of thought and circumstance. It ought not to be answered in terms suggested by those who see nothing valuable about history save as a short introductory background for their static political analyses. There had long been, as I have shown elsewhere²⁶, the impression of the "military seal" in the Ottoman-Turkish context, going back some six hundred years pre-Enverist days, penetrating and influencing the practice of the state. We were to see its full imprint once again, with the "irade" of 7 January 1914. Accordingly, our question will only be answered, in so far as it can ever be answered, if we attest the fact that the officer corps responded to the changes in circumstances and the movement of thought while their own power enabled them to play the ruling group role in shaping the body politic.

Having witnessed this development, the then Chief Secretary to the Sultan, Ali Fuad Bey, also commented, as had the British Military Attaché, on those "very drastic changes". Yet unlike his contemporary, his attitude to the "changes" is expressed in general terms, terms which indicate the Chief Secretary's close familiarity with the subtleties of political reflection :

²⁶ See : M.N. Turfan, *The politics of military politics*, esp. Ch.2.

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"Henceforward, the reins of government ["zimam-i idare"] passed from the hands of the Sublime Porte into those of Enver Paşa"²⁷.

For clues as to what is implicit in this generalization, it is time we turn back to a survey of developments, or "changes in circumstances" as I have labelled them, and start from the fall of Edirne to the combined forces of Serbia and Bulgaria on 26 March 1913²⁸.

The fall of Edirne marks the beginning of a new stage of developments. These, in turn, set in motion the forces which, with regard to the external and internal politics of the Ottoman state, were permanently to affect the balance of power both in the Balkans and in civil-military relations.

The impending danger from Bulgaria, the principal adversary of the Empire among the Balkan allies, had already made itself felt. It reached a peak with the fall of Edirne and the renewal of the Bulgarian offensive at the Çatalca line of defence with the aim of entering the Ottoman capital. By 1 April, judging from the "Daily Notebook" of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, a visible halt on the long road of territorial aggrandisement on which Bulgaria had set foot occurred when that offensive was repulsed²⁹. But it was not until 7 April that such an aggrandisement showed signs of lessening, when it was definitely understood that the Bulgarian Government was anxious to conclude an armistice bilaterally and immediately³⁰. By then, as one contemporary had written, "the Ottoman Empire was at an end of its easily realizable resources in men and money. Bulgaria ... was even worse off"³¹. It was clear that, under the circumstances, neither side was able to inflict upon the other a defeat as would be decisive in ending the war. Moreover, for Bulgaria, there appeared the ominous signs of a latent conflict within the Balkan alliance which would become "fratricidal"³² once the major unity of interest were exhausted, and separate nationalist interests would try to realize

²⁷ A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 111.

²⁸ For the military details, an authoritative source is : R. Yigitgüden, *1912-1913 Balkan Harbinde Edirne Kale muharebeleri*. Istanbul : Askeri Matbaa, 1938-1939. 2 cilt.

²⁹ "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa. 10 (4 Mart 1965). Entry for 7 April 1913.

³⁰ "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa. 10 (4 Mart 1965). Entry for 7 April 1913.

³¹ A Diplomatist [George Young], *Nationalism and war in the Near East*. (Ed.) Lord Courtney of Penwith. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1915 ; p.241. Also see : *Ibid.*, pp. 241-242.

³² In his British Academy's Raleigh Lecture (1931) on "The role of Bosnia in international politics (1875-1914)", R.W. Selon-Watson used the term "fratricidal" in describing the turning of the Balkan alliance into a war. The lecture is found in pp. 262-293 in : L.S. Sutherland (ed.), *Studies in history : British Academy lectures*. London : Oxford University Press, 1966, see p. 290.

themselves at each other's expense. Major-General Fuller's maxim aptly expresses this kind of situation which, by April, took precedence over all other problems that Bulgaria faced :

"War alliances against a common enemy are proverbially ephemeral, for once the enemy has been defeated the alliance's centre of gravity is destroyed"³³.

As the war gained a new momentum in Macedonia, away from Thrace, in the middle of March 1913, perennial Graeco-Bulgar rivalry in Macedonia erupted in the form of armed clashes. The "Realpolitik" of the irredentist policies of Greece and other Balkan states, such as Romania, are questions that lie outside the purview of our inquiry. What lies inside is the fact that as a direct result of these, "Bulgaria desired a rapid conclusion of an armistice so that it might transfer its army from Thrace to Macedonia"³⁴. On 13 April, the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" received a message from the Ottoman Deputy Commander -in-Chief, Major-General Ahmed Izzet Paşa, that the Ottoman and Bulgarian field commands had reached agreement and that the firing had ceased³⁵. Two days later, having negotiated directly, both countries finally suspended hostilities for a ten-day period³⁶. This informal armistice, extended several times bilaterally, provided the Empire with a period of two months free from fighting at the major fronts - for the first time since the war had been re-opened on 3 February.

Until the fighting ceased, there had been no proper breathing space in the domestic affairs of the state since the Karadag (Montenegro) Chargé at Istanbul had presented the declaration of war (8 October 1912). The actual

³³ J.F.C. Fuller, *The decisive battles of the western world, 1792-1944*. (Ed.) J. Terraine. St Albans : Paladin, 1970. 2 vols. Vol.2, p. 431.

³⁴ E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*. New York: Russell & Russell, 1938 ; p. 308.

³⁵ G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 215.

³⁶ E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars. 1912-1913*, p. 308. Also cf. the statement by Bayur : Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbi tarihi*, Cilt II, Kısım 2. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII. Seri-Sayı 14. Ankara: T.T.K. Basimevi, 1943 ; [Hereinafter, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbi tarihi*, II/2] ; pp. 308-309. For documentation, see, for example : *Lowther to Grey*, Tel. N°199, Constantinople, 17 April 1913, in G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley (eds.), *British documents on the origins of the War, 1898-1914*, London, H.M.S.O., 1926-1938. 11 vols. [Hereinafter, B.D.] ; IX/2, N°857, p. 698 ; *Bompard à Pichon*, Tel. N°213, Péra, 15 avril 1913, in Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Commission de Publication des Documents Relatifs aux Origines de la Guerre de 1914, *Documents diplomatiques français (1871-1914)*. 3 séries. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 1929-1959. 43 tomes. [Hereinafter, D.D.F.] ; Tome VI, 3e Série, N°306, p. 362 ; and *Bompard à Pichon*, Tel.N°217, Péra, 16 avril 1913, D.D.F., Tome VI, 3e Série, N°318, p. 371.

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fighting was no longer, at least for the time being, the leading feature of the politics of the state, but the performance and quality of the Ottoman armed forces which did the fighting remained the most important, yet unsettled, question. The respite gained from the war was thus occupied, true to past experience, principally by attempts at improving the armed forces. This aspect appears to have been dominating the mind of the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" even before the peace was realized. For Mahmud Şevket Paşa, as a careful reading of an entry in his "Daily Notebook"³⁷ for 19 March implies, the actual political, economic and especially military situation in peace-time would be conducive to the consideration of improvement in the administration. The country, or what remained of it, was still suffering from the effects of war. The economic situation was, partly also as a result of war, at a very low ebb. The political instability was tending to being to the fore anti-Unionist elements, at the time basically devoid of any programme save that of factional opposition. That these circumstances precluded any other consideration than the strengthening of the authority and competence of the Government seems evident enough. But the characteristic, and indeed - prevailing, belief of Ottoman statesmen that the power of states should be measured by the strength of their military institutions seems also to have been held by the "Sadr-ı Â'zam". As he recorded³⁸, the Ottoman weakness in the Balkan War made the Empire unacceptable as an ally to either the Triple Alliance or the Triple Entente. To rectify this condition, the most important work during the peace would be to strengthen the Army and Navy. Moreover, for this task Germany and Britain were to be consulted.

This is by no means a full account of Mahmud Şevket Paşa's reasoning on the need to improve the strength of the Ottoman armed forces. Yet it is sufficient, I hope, to show its importance both in preparing the ground for the German military assistance and in setting in motion the "Sadr-ı Â'zam"'s prevailing desire of seeking such assistance.

It is opportune, I suggest, to speculate further on these aspects of the matter, since it was only within the context of the current propitious circumstances that such a conception could have taken definite shape. As the

³⁷ "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.7 (11 Şubat 1965). Entry for 19 March 1913.

³⁸ For Mahmud Şevket Paşa's thoughts on the structure and character of alliances, see : "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.7 (11 Şubat 1965). Entry for 19 March 1913. He had, almost three years earlier, already expressed his thoughts freely to the British Ambassador "Mahmud Şevket has more than once said to me that all Turkey requires is a strong military force and with that her position is asserted". *Lowther to Grey*, N° 521, Conf., Therapia, 30 July 1910, B.D., IX/ 1, N°161, pp. 180-183 ; p. 183.

ceasefire with Bulgaria held, the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" did not merely put on to paper his thoughts about German military assistance, but spoke to the German Ambassador about it. Wangenheim, in his long report of 26 April, allocated most of the space, with additional comments, to repeating exactly what the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" had said, in German, to him :

"...Hier muss das Ausland helfen. Ich werde mich daher an die verschiedenen Kabinette mit der Bitte um Überlassung von Reformern wenden. Für die Reorganisation der Armee rechne ich bestimmt auf Deutschland. Dies ist der wichtigste Punkt meins Programms. Die Armee muss von Grund aus reformiert, der politische Geist dem Offizierskorps ausgetrieben werden. Dazu wird Tätigkeit von Instruktionsoffizieren, wie sie jetzt hier und da als blosse Ratgeber in unsere Organisation eingeschoben sind, nicht genügen..."³⁹.

The political implications of the "Sadr-ı Â'zam"'s "most important" consideration seem fairly obvious, yet not complete. On the basis of this evidence only, a sceptic might suggest that Wangenheim could have put these remarks into the mouth of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, with whom he was familiar, and in so doing could have hoped to serve the national interest of Germany in whose service he was employed. Therefore, we need another piece of evidence - evidence that should not be selected in order to render direct support to our hypothesis, which might then run too smoothly to be true. Evidence of this type is supplied by the then "Guardian" of Istanbul, Cemal Bey. From his "Hâtıralar" it would appear that the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" also spoke to Cemal Bey about his thoughts on putting the armed forces into proper order,

"...about the complete elucidation of which, since it relies upon the explanation given to me by himself personally, I ask that no one should doubt the truth.

The Paşa, during his term of office as the "Sadr-ı Â'zam", usually used to spend the night at the Sublime Porte and sleep there. Since I too slept at the Istanbul 'Guardianship' on some evenings,

³⁹ *Wangenheim an den Bethmann Hollweg*, Nr. 125, Pera, 26 April 1913, G.P., 38. Band, Nr. 15439, pp. 196-201. This report is also quoted extensively and analyzed in its wider setting by the historian, Bayur, who gives what is still the best commentary on the further thoughts of Mahmud Şevket Paşa and their implications on Ottoman foreign policies : Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbi tarihi*, II/3, pp. 55-60. Also see: G.W. Swanson, *War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid II to 1913 : Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*, pp. 382-383.

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when he felt tired after having worked hard during the day, he used to order me on the telephone to visit him after dinner.

On these occasions he used to explain to me matters which he had thought of and initiated and ask me what my thoughts and opinions were. On one of these evenings he had told me thus :

'My son, ... as for our army, we cannot cut ourselves off any longer from the German methods of warfare. For over thirty years, in our army, there have been German instructors ; our corps of officers have been trained entirely along German lines ; in short, our army have gained familiarity with the spirit of German military skill and education. Now, it is not possible to change this. I am, therefore, thinking of bringing a German organizing mission ["Alman tensik heyeti"] on a grand scale and even, if necessary, by giving the command of an Ottoman army corps to a German general, of appointing German staff and field officers to its every unit ; and of posting to a model army corps which would be formed in this way, ail the staff and field officers of the Ottoman army for a certain period as trainees in order to increase their knowledge. Apart from these, I shall also call for many military experts, again within the improvement mission ["islah heyeti"], in order to organize and, for a period, to administer the Ministry of War departments, the General Staff, the military schools and the military factories. I shall expend ail my efforts, in their widest and most comprehensive meaning, for the organizing and improving of the army. From now on, I am in mind to avoid war for a long time"⁴⁰.

⁴⁰ Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar* : İttihat-Terakki ve Birinci Dünya Harbi. (Tamamliyan ve tertipleyen) B. Cemal. İstanbul: Selek Yayınları, 1959; pp. 78-79 ; and its English version : Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman, 1913-1919*. New York : George H. Doran, 1922 ; (Reprint edition, 1973, by Arno Press used here) ; pp. 66-67. It should particularly be noted that here the translation of the quotation is mine, but I have used the published, English version as a basis, correcting it as necessary, for the sake of comparison if not accuracy. Secondly, it is to be remembered that Cemal Bey (Paşa) wrote his memoirs in 1919 (he was then in Europe), relying on a few fragments of documents but mostly on his own memory. In our case, no date is specified as to *when exactly* Mahmud Şevket Paşa spoke to him at the Sublime Porte. A clue is found at the end of the "Sadır-ı Â'zam"'s talk. He ends it thus : "... Therefore I am about to inquire of the Germans on what terms they would be prepared to provide us with such a mission. First of all, I would find it more suitable to let them inform [us] of the conditions of employment". Cemal Paşa, *op. cit.*, p. 79. Cf. Djemal Pasha, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68. It is only, therefore, in view of circumstantial evidence that I tentatively conclude that Mahmud Şevket Paşa must have talked to Cemal Bey "one evening" some time before 26 April 1913 - the date when the German Ambassador despatched his report Nr. 15439. See F.N. 38 above.

Although the "Hâtiralar" of Cemal Paşa has become a standard source or scholars in dealing with Mahmud Şevket Paşa's thoughts on German military assistance, or even for some Ottoman thought on such aid, none appears to have paid attention to their real significance. First, this lies not in what the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" had told Cemal Bey about his intention of bringing the mission but, on the contrary, in what he had failed to tell him but had subsequently told the German Ambassador as the main justification for his action. Therefore, what such evidence does make perfectly clear is the existence of anxiety on the part of Mahmud Şevket Paşa as to how to control the military's partisan political activities. Secondly, if the complementary political relationship between the officer corps and the Government were to be compromised, the compromise would have to be at the expense of the officer corps' subsequently relinquishing military authority to a German general⁴¹. Thirdly, it again tells us something about the power of the "young" officers. Here was the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" of the Ottoman Empire explaining to an Ottoman colonel, however prominent the latter then was, a policy issue which should have exceeded Staff-Colonel Cemal Bey's professional sphere of reference. The fact that it was not so is the very point that may help us to understand why the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" felt inclined, or rather was obliged, "to explain" this particular "matter" to Cemal Bey. This incident also clarifies, I hope, my thesis that it was just another "matter" on which the "thoughts" and "opinions" of a "young officer" had to be taken into account by whoever was

⁴¹ *Wangenheim an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr. 269, Konstantinopel, 17 Mai 1913, *G.P.*, 38. Band, Nr. 15303, pp. 33-35. Furthermore, some days later, to the German Military Attaché Mahmud Şevket Paşa "... emphasized that if the Kaiser were willing to agree to his request for a German general, it would be most desirable for the man to have had no acquaintance with events in Turkey. This would prevent the officer appointed from leaning too much on one of the Turkish officers known to him from earlier times. This had happened to von der Goltz, who had favoured a Turkish officer (not Şevket) to such an extent that dissatisfaction and dissention arose in the highest Ottoman military circles". Stempel to Kriegsministerium, Nr. 716, Konstantinopel, 26 Mai 1913, A.A., Türkei 139, Nr.A10886 in: G.W. Swanson, *War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid II to 1913 : Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*, p. 384. Swanson cites the above document in order to support his assertion as to why "... Şevket acted deliberately when he passed over his former mentor [i.e., von der Goltz]" (*Ibid.*, loc. cit.). However, this evidence seems to me to have a broader significance than merely the rejection of von der Goltz solely on the basis of his favouritism of one officer and the ensuing, alleged, dissention that arose "... in the highest Ottoman military circles". I do not find Mahmud Şevket Paşa's reasoning, and Swanson's uncritical acceptance of it, convincing. It touches only tangentially upon the problem of "control", which I hold to be the centre of the question.

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in charge of government⁴². And finally, one might further argue on the basis of the same evidence that Mahmud Şevket Paşa had no hope and, indeed, no intention of re-capturing Edirne. It seems plain that for the "Sadr-ı Â'zam"'s plan of "organizing" and "improving" the Army, the avoidance of war "... for a long time" was essential⁴³. This, indeed, meant that any idea of the recovery of Edirne should be quashed since it was known by all concerned that such a task could, under the circumstances, only be accomplished through war ; ironically, it was the issue of Edirne's cession to Bulgaria that had provided the *casus belli* for the Raid on the Sublime Porte in the first place. Again, the Paşa's judgement depended on the view he took of the chief actors of whom, for example, Cemal Bey had to be convinced why there should be no occasion for war "... for a long time".

Whether or not Staff-Colonel Cemal Bey was convinced when Mahmud Şevket Paşa induced him to accept his reasons for inviting a German military mission cannot be ascertained fully through reading the "Hâtıralar". However, after explaining the circumstances of the arrival of the Liman von Sanders Mission, Cemal Bey remarks, "We wanted to organize our army and therefore we had applied to Germany"⁴⁴. Reflection may make much of this reasoning seem invalid. But it is worth noticing that Cemal Bey's own position is not ambiguous. Following incessant domestic

⁴² See M.N. Turfan, *The politics of military politics*, pp. 197ff. All the more so, if we establish that the after-dinner talk took place before 2 March - the date on which Mahmud Şevket Paşa had asserted, for the first time, at a Cabinet meeting, that it was necessary to bring a "prominent German general". Yet on the basis of available evidence it is not possible to ascertain that it did. Therefore, I cannot pursue further the thesis that the "ratification", as it were, of the "matter" by the military preceded the Governmental agreement.

⁴³ According to the historian, Aktepe, "Mahmud Şevket Paşa could not bring himself to believe, one way or another, that Edirne could be recovered". M. Aktepe, "Atatürk'ün Sofya Ateşeliğine kadar İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile olan Mûnasebetleri ve bu hususla alakalı bir belge", *Belleten*, XXXVIII : 150 (Nisan) 1974, pp. 263-294 ; p. 291, F.N. 70. In addition to Aktepe's evidence, which is based on Mahmud Şevket Paşa's own writings (i.e., "Not defteri"), further evidence indicates quite clearly that this was the case. On 2 April the Paşa officially submitted his request to the Kaiser, to place at the Empire's disposal "a suitable Prussian officer" who would be able to refortify Istanbul. See : *Treutler, z.Z. in Homburg v.d.H., an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.7, Homburg, 2 April 1913, *G.P.*, 38. Band, Nr. 15436, p. 195. Such a request, with which the Germans had agreed to comply once the peace had been realized, + implies that the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" had no intention of recapturing Edirne. Since the frontier would then be very close to Istanbul, he appears to have thought that by fortifying the city he would be able to support himself against those "young" officers who still nourished the hope of recovering Edirne. Cf., the comment of Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbi tarihi*, II/3, p. 280. + *Treutler z.Z. in Homburg v.d.H., an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.13, Homburg, 4 April 1913, *G.P.*, 38. Band, Nr. 15437, p. 196 ; and *Jagow an den Treutler*, Nr.7, Berlin, 5 April 1913, *G.P.*, 38. Band, Nr. 15438, p. 196.

⁴⁴ Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 31. Cf., Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 69.

uprisings and foreign wars, it had become clear to these whose opinions counted that substantial changes in social institutions were necessary if the remains of the Empire were to survive. The political programmes of successive Unionist Governments, according to Cemal Bey, were constructed so as "... to take heed of conflicts with foreign countries while devoting national energies to domestic reforms"⁴⁵. In justifying the attitude of the Unionists, Hüseyin Cahid Bey, in a contemporary editorial, propogated the point that

"... the disease of apathy is worse than war. War is an examination, an examination our nation took and failed, proving that it has been a lazy student, one who has not acquired the knowledge necessary to graduate. We now have before us two goals : to repair the ravages of war and to reform our administration"⁴⁶.

This article appeared on 26 April 1913, the same day that the German Ambassador informed his Government about the way in which the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" viewed German help in reforming one of the major social institutions, the military. For our purpose, there is no need to discuss in detail the mechanism of reform that successive Governments devised in connection with the other social institutions. It is sufficient to note that they were a number of responses developed with the aim of anticipating and nullifying the domestic and international challenges.

The cataclysmic events leading up to the restoration of the 1876 Constitution in 1908 had emerged as being fundamentally military and political in character ; they proved to have been a momentary regression in an evolution by which, while a militaristic fabric was permeated with increasingly Turkish-nationalistic ideas, the society was being unobtrusively

⁴⁵ Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 83-84. Cf. Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 71.

⁴⁶ *Tanin*, 13 Nisan 1329 (26 April 1913). Also quoted in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 140 (Ahmad's translation used here).

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indoctrinated in the ways of state control⁴⁷. State control increased with the danger of dismemberment, a danger especially felt after the losses incurred in the Balkans. The notion of "control" therefore came to be of prime importance to the Unionist Governments for the justification and maintenance of their governance. The close integration of the mechanism of political controls over the social institutions and the mechanism of reforms in them is a feature that always stands in need of particular emphasis.

Thus we come to another aspect, namely the effectiveness of political control, precisely because the logical pursuit of reforms involved the ability to control the social institutions.

This partly explains why, having managed to pass a resolution in the Cabinet in favour of requesting from Germany a military mission under a prominent general (13 May), Mahmud Şevket Paşa envisaged that :

"...Uns sei die Reform der Armee unter der fast diktatorischen Oberleitung eines deutschen Generals zgedacht und ebenso die Reorganisation des gesamten Unterrichtswesens"⁴⁸.

⁴⁷ For example, cf. E.D. Akarlı, "The state as a socio-cultural phenomenon in Turkey", pp. 135-162 in E.D. Akarlı and G. Ben-Dor (eds.), *Political participation in Turkey : historical background and present problems*. Istanbul : Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975 ; esp. p. 138 and pp. 142-143. On the ways of state control following 1908, I have not come across a work that deals adequately with the patterns of indoctrination. However, Mardin's "Center-periphery relations" is quite helpful for understanding the state ("center" in Mardin's terminology) as a power base and the evolution of some of its institutions - an evolution in which "... the old Ottoman motto of preservation of 'religion and the state' ... emerged refurbished in the Young Turk slogan of 'Union and Progress'". Ş. A. Mardin, "Center periphery relations : a key to Turkish politics ?", pp. 7-32 in *ibid.* ; p. 21. What I mean is that it is the question "How was the 'motto' 'refurbished' within the Ottoman state and society ?" Which still awaits a fuller treatment, despite the recent attempts by F. Ahmad, "The state and intervention in Turkey", *Turcica*, XVI, 1984, pp. 51-64 , and M. Heper, *The state tradition in Turkey*. Beverley : Eothen Press, 1985.

⁴⁸ *Wangenheim an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr. 269, Konstantinopel, 17 Mai 1913, *G.P.*, 38. Band, Nr. 15303, pp. 33-35. Cf., "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa. 20 (13 Mayıs 1965). Entry for 17 May 1913. The German Kaiser too tried to convince the Russian Minister of Finance and the President of the Council of Ministers, Kokowtsoff (Kokovtsov), regarding the military mission: "At the present period, the instructors must have the necessary power to re-educate the Turkish officers, and to drag them out of the political mire in which they are so engrossed with politics as to forget the duties of their service". *The Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Sazanoff* (Sazanov), Confidential Letter, 821 November 1913, N° 781, pp. 676-677, in, B. de Siebert, *Entente diplomacy and the world : matrix of the history of Europe*. (Ed.) G.A. Schreiner. London : George Allen and Unwin, 1921. Cf., *Delcassé à Pichon*, Tel. Nos. 707, 708, Conf. Saint- Petersburg, 24 novembre 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VIII, 3e série, N°521, p. 659.

For the "Sadr-ı Â'zam", the idea of a German general with "dictatorial" authority and power appears to have offered a way out of the impasse created by two factors which had so far proved equally potent : the inability of the "elders", statesmen and soldiers alike, to control the "young" officers effectively and the belief that no reform in any of the social institutions would be achieved without first realizing governmental control over their introduction. In the case of the military institution such control became all the more essential, in the first place, because the military institution was hierarchical or, rather, had to be maintained in that shape for its professional efficiency. Secondly, as a prominent student of international politics has put it :

"Once security is destroyed, all the higher objects of politics are swallowed up in the struggle for self-preservation, a tendency seen in every war"⁴⁹.

He might have added : a tendency particularly seen in the aftermath of a lost war. For to "the Ottoman mind", the instrument that enabled states to assent themselves in international politics was, as I have noted, the strength of their military institution. Therefore, reforming and improving the efficiency of the military was representative among the desired institutional reforms not only for its practical necessity but also for its theoretical implications. At a deeper level of his causation, the deliberations of the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" and the resultant policy of reforming the Army with German assistance confirms a political plan of combining idealism and self-interest in balanced proportions.

There was, however, a drawback. This plan, more than any other for the reforming of the social institutions, depended upon the willingness of the personnel, that is, the officer corps, to comply with what the Government had agreed on. Certainly, Mahmud Şevket Paşa always had doubts about this, but if he were to proceed at all he had to act as if no doubts existed. As for the officer corps, there was every reason why they should be sympathetic toward and even support the "Sadr-ı Â'zam"'s declared aim of organizing the Army with German assistance. In the first place, the period of peace from mid-April was propitious for hastening the reorganization which had come secretly into operation with the 14 February Regulations. The officer corps appears to have seen the German military assistance strictly in terms of what is implied by the word "assistance". In the Empire, defeat had always

⁴⁹ M. Wight, *Power politics*. (Ed.) H. Bull and C. Holbraad. Leicester : Leicester University Press, 1978 ; p. 292.

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prompted military reform and, nearly always, with outside help. Therefore, as we have noted in Cemal Bey's account, after the defeat in the Balkan War, for a demoralized officer there was no reason to be suspicious of Mahmud Şevket Paşa's prevailing desire in applying for German assistance. In the circumstances, foreign military help seemed a natural way to reform the army. Strictly on this issue, the only question would have been the possibility of the Government's searching elsewhere. Even that possibility, unless the Germans refused the request, appeared remote. After all, Mahmud Şevket Paşa's reasoning to Cemal Bey on the necessity of not just foreign military assistance but specifically German military assistance must have sounded logical enough. This is certainly the impression one gets from reading the latter's "Hâtıralar".

In the second place, the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" could hardly have declared to the officer corps that the kind of reform he had in mind was to "... remove politics from the officer corps" - the very words in which he had made his priorities clear to the German Ambassador. Had he done so, the officers would have removed him from "politics". Nor did the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" inform the members of the Cabinet about his main intention, except to talk about the need to invite German advisers as reformers. He managed to put through his proposal and to obtain a Cabinet resolution to this effect.

And yet, where we are impressed by the ease with which Mahmud Şevket Paşa's plan was accepted, he himself still felt the difficulty of obtaining a general assent to his decisions, especially in view of one important obstacle, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ahmed Izzet Paşa. Unpublished parts of Mahmud Şevket Paşa's "Daily Notebook", as revealed by Swanson, make this point clear. On the day the Cabinet decided to request a military mission headed by a German general, the "Sadr-ı Â'zam"

"...wondered about Izzet's opposition. He even considered giving Izzet a post that would separate him from the army command"⁵⁰.

Four days later, on 17 May, when he talked to Wangenheim about giving dictatorial authority and power to the German general, Mahmud Şevket Paşa

⁵⁰ G.W. Swanson, War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid II to 1913 : Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission, p. 383. I have not been able to see the unpublished parts of the "Not defteri" on which the quotation is based, and have therefore used Swanson's translation. These "parts" were also utilized in his Indiana University thesis (1970) : G.W. Swanson, Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire, see p. 232. Based on : "Not defteri", Hayat, Sa. 19 (6 Mayıs 1965). Entry for 13 May 1913 ; and especially, "Unpublished diary", entry for 13 May 1913.

"... recommended to the ambassador that no announcement be made while the army was at Çatalca"⁵¹. In the face of this potential source of opposition, the "Sadr-ı Â'zam"'s power to make an official announcement was limited. Moreover, even in collaboration with the Ambassador, he was in a weaker position than the available documents would indicate : there had always been an active and firmly entrenched body of opinion of the "young" officers on every matter concerning policies. More importantly, such opinion had to be taken into account by every politician before reaching any decision. All the more so, if the matter happened to be related directly to a policy aimed at curbing that body of opinion, while "... a sweeping reform which would remove politics from the officer corps" was the policy as Mahmud Şevket Paşa saw it. Yet he must have been aware of the restrictions on his actions and that he could not openly acknowledge them without destroying his remaining power of government. But he could, without destroying his power of negotiation on the particulars of authority which the German general would have, talk to the Germans as if he were able to enforce whatever settlement they both wished. This became apparent when the German Ambassador, on 22 May, transmitted to his Government Mahmud Şevket Paşa 's official request to the Kaiser for a "leading German general". The Ambassador noted that, although the details had not yet been established, the German general, it was thought, would have full authority, more or less similar to that of General Eydoux in Greece, in all military matters. He would head all other German officers and would therefore be responsible for the execution of reform in the "Turkish" army⁵².

The moot question in this document was that of to whom the German general, invested with this degree of authority, would be responsible. Wangenheim does not provide any answer. Nor do the available Ottoman sources. However, assuring the Ambassador, as he had privately on 17 May⁵³, that the Ottoman Government would extend to the German military mission similar rights to those which the Greek Government had granted to the French military mission, would in practice mean giving a free

⁵¹ G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 232 ; quoting from : "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa. 20 (13 Mayıs 1965). Entry for 17 May 1913 ; "Unpublished diary", entry for 17 May 1913.

⁵² *Wangenheim an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr. 282, Konstantinopel, 22 Mai 1913, *G.P.*, 38. Band, Nr. 15440, pp. 201-202. The report is quoted extensively in : G.W. Swanson, *War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid II to 1913 : Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*, p. 383 ; and in part in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/3, pp. 282-283.

⁵³ "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa. 20 (13 Mayıs 1965). Entry for 17 May 1913. For Wangenheim's reporting of this talk, see F.N. 47 above.

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hand to the Germans in deciding on the nature of the authority that the general would have. The political implications of the "Sadr-ı Â'zam"'s perception of the duties of the German general seem fairly obvious. He was attempting to execute a policy which in his heart he knew to be impossible, either because there was no alternative or because the only alternative was the one which he had so far refused to contemplate - surrendering to the "young" officers. This was the central dilemma for the Ottoman "civilians" in their efforts to impose some control over the officer corps before it was too late. But by May 1913 it was indeed late.

As I have pointed out, the other means of restraining the officer corps had to be ruled out because of their ineffectiveness from the Government's point of view. If the remaining political solution of explicit action, through the control of military training and education under the powers of the Ottoman Deputy Commander-in-Chief as the highest military authority, were to be ruled out on the grounds of its futility, the only alternative would be to settle down under the "young" officers' dispensation.

Judging by his attempts, Mahmud Şevket Paşa was not ready for this. Under the circumstances, then, there seemed nothing left for the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" but to resort to German help - a kind of help which aimed at an exchange of benefits between parties who had no common base on which to conduct negotiations⁵⁴. During the period of peace, from April to June, such negotiations seem to have achieved a degree of success. Yet the position of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ahmed Izzet Paşa, regarding the German military mission was very different. His opinion, on the basis of what he later wrote, was not in accord with that of the Government until at least the end of June. All along, he appears to have thought that the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" wished to provide the German general with the title and powers of, in effect, Deputy Commander-in-Chief⁵⁵. This would mean the replacement of Ahmed

⁵⁴ On the basis of the German Ambassador's report of 26 April, from which I have already quoted, Wangenheim appears to have thought that Mahmud Şevket Paşa's "... aim was for a German-influenced army which would then provide support for continued Young Turk rule ...". As for the benefit which would accrue to Germany, the Ambassador was even more explicit : "*Die Macht, welche die Armee kontrolliert, wird in der Türkei immer die stärkste sein. Es wird keiner deutschfeindlichen Regierung möglich sein, sich am Ruder zu halten, wenn die Armee von uns kontrolliert ist*". (Emphasis is his). *Wangenheim an den Bethmann Hollweg*, Nr. 125, Pera, 26 April 1913, G.P., Nr. 15439, pp. 196-201.

⁵⁵ The thoughts of Ahmed Izzet Paşa are found in : [Ahmed] Izzet Pascha, *Denkwürdigkeiten des Marshalls Izzet Pascha : ein kritischer Beitrag zur Kriegsschuldfrage*. (Übersetzung und Herausgegeben) K. Klinghardt. Leipzig : K.F. Koehler, 1927, pp. 225-227. Also cf., as reported by the British Military Attaché in Istanbul : *Tyrrell to Mallet*, N° 41, Constantinople, 2 December 1913, *B.D.*, X/1, Enclosure in N°391, pp. 349-351.

Izzet Paşa by a German general. It was indeed so, not because the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" wanted to check Ahmed Izzet Paşa's power by the employment of a German general in his stead, but because he wanted to check the power of the "young" officers. Had Ahmed Izzet Paşa possessed the power with which he was theoretically endowed by his position, the present argument suggests that there would have been no real need to search for a different source of power - a "prominent German general". On the other hand, Ahmed Izzet Paşa was in a position to incite his fellow officers to make the project impossible by revealing to them the real motive for inviting German assistance. It was this kind of power, the power of incitement, that Ahmed Izzet Paşa possessed, especially at a time when a considerable number of the forces were still at their defensive positions at Catalca. Keeping this aspect in mind, it is then possible to understand, at least partially, why the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" was anxious to keep the project quiet, as he recommended to the German Ambassador on 17 June. Therefore, the crux of the matter is that a German general, in the "Sadr-ı Â'zam"'s mind, might be able to impose a radical solution to the problem regarding which the declared inability of Ahmed Izzet Paşa to do anything except offer advice to Mahmud Şevket Paşa afforded a gloomy prospect. Advice of this sort, simply underlining in a frank, even pathetic, way the Deputy Commander-in-Chief's lack of initiative against the officer corps, had indeed been proffered to Mahmud Şevket Paşa earlier that year in the wake of the failed Şarköy-Bolayır offensive for the relief of the besieged Edirne. Failure in such a vital offensive had precipitated an outbreak of the latent rivalry among the importunate "young" officers, marked by ill-disciplined quarrels with mutual accusations, threats and disruptive demands. Ahmed Izzet Paşa had written, at that time :

"If it is absolutely impossible that these irresponsible persons who are toying so carelessly with the fate of the motherland be disciplined under military law by the Government, [then] at the very least, those of their friends who have personal influence over and standing with them should be put forward as mediators. [Meanwhile] I am hastily submitting this petition on the matter to Your Highness' August Offices, with the conviction that it is fitting that there be requested of them a little self-sacrifice, a little moderation and compassion for this poor motherland ; in short, respect and obedience for the [military] laws and regulations"⁵⁶.

⁵⁶ A secret letter, dated 22 February 1913, possibly found among the private papers of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, was first obtained by Aktepe and reproduced in full in : M. Aktepe, *Atatürk'ün Sofya Ateşeliğine kadar İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile olan münasebetleri vebü*

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Clearly, while he may have been an efficient Chief of the General Staff, Ahmed Izzet Paşa's performance as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief had been one of political inertia and military impotence. Conscious of the precariousness of his position, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief could not view with equanimity the policy of delegating great authority to a German general. On 1 June, he confronted the "Sadr-ı Â'zam", arguing against entrusting the supreme command to a foreigner and proposing that the German general should have command only of an army corps⁵⁷. It is true, as Swanson has observed, that "... there is unfortunately no clue about how Sevket reacted to Izzet's statement"⁵⁸. But it is also true to say that until equally comprehensive evidence to the contrary is adduced, Mahmud Şevket Paşa seems to have taken no notice of the opposition from Ahmed Izzet Paşa nor, for that matter, from anyone else, for example Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, the then Ottoman Ambassador to Germany.

As far as my present argument is concerned, the point here in need of reiteration is that the inviting of the German military mission was just another issue in which Mahmud Şevket Paşa needed to come to terms only with the powerful "young" officers. This would, again, make the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" capable of overcoming any opposition. But whether it would have made him so or, on the other hand, whether he would have succeeded in "removing politics from the officer corps" with German assistance cannot be ascertained but must ever remain a matter for speculation. In any case, although the "Sadr-ı Â'zam" learned, on 6 June, the Kaiser's decision to appoint a general to head the military mission⁵⁹, he was unable to pursue his

hususla alâkalıbir belge ; the pages between p. 276 and p. 277 contain the manuscript facsimile.

⁵⁷ "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa. 27 (1 Temmuz 1965). Entry for 1 June 1913 and "Unpublished diary", entry for 1 June 1913. Quoted in : G.W. Swanson, *War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid II to 1913 : Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*, p. 384.

⁵⁸ G.W. Swanson, *War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid II to 1913 : Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*, p. 384.

⁵⁹ "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa. 29 (15 Temmuz 1965). Entry for 6 June 1913 and "Unpublished diary", entry for 6 June 1913. Quoted in : G.W. Swanson, *War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid II to 1913 : Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*, p. 384. Following the Kaiser's decision, on 15 June, "Generalleutnant" Liman von Sanders, then the Commander of the 22nd Division in Kassel, was asked by the German Military Cabinet whether he was ready and willing to go to Turkey as chief of a German military mission. + He agreed. On 30 June 1913, the head of the German Military Cabinet officially informed the Chancellor that General Liman von Sanders was available as the "Chief of Mission".+++ [O.V.K.] Liman von Sanders, *Five years in Turkey*. (Trans.) C.

preoccupation. As he was being driven through the streets of Istanbul to the Sublime Porte, late in the morning of 11 June 1913, Mahmud Şevket Paşa was assassinated.

IV

The foregoing conclusions may seem at first sight highly improbable and, above all, premature. But the truth of them is supported not only by theoretical considerations and the result of historical analysis, but by very definite evidence of a purely external nature. To me the evidence is so unequivocal that I have to accept it empirically even when I may not be able to relate it to any other previous study. Still, anyone may accept, on such a basis, my Most Significant Cause and its conjunction with Mahmud Şevket Paşa's Real Cause, or reject it. But the important thing is that it is clear what has to be accepted or rejected. Further, certain accompanying features lead me to infer that it represents Mahmud Şevket Paşa's situation at a more fundamental level than historians are prone to choose, especially one feature - the "reorganization" - which has been inferred normally as the constant in their analyses. For the inductive generalization arrived at on the basis of my analysis does not altogether coincide with those that might have been expected from the deductive consideration of the attributes commonly ascribed to the Ottomans, or to Mahmud Şevket Paşa for that matter.

What are we to think of all this ?

To begin with, it must confirm my conclusions that, first, the "control" aspect is not a figment of my historical imagination, simply because it seems plain that the two agents, Mahmud Şevket Paşa and Baron von Wangenheim - the Paşa's contemporary observer, conflated the two issues of control of the Ottoman officer corps and control of the Ottoman Empire - not respectively, but each for his own respective purpose. And they did so in such a way as to invoke a clear pattern of causation, not least in the mind of any disinterested observer. Secondly, the "control" aspect marked a crucial stage in the process of this historical causation - if I am to report Mahmud Şevket Paşa and his Real Cause aright.