

*Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée
orientale et le monde turco-iranien*
N° 5, janvier-juin 1988

"LOOKING AFTER AND PROTECTING THE REPUBLIC"

The Legitimation of the Military's Authority in Turkey¹

M. Naim TURFAN

"Hommes en place, ... me
permettez vous de le dire ? Ne vous
reposez point sur vos descendants
pour le soin de votre mémoire et
pour la durée de votre nom."

La Bruyère, *Les caractères*.

I

The main object of the present essay is to prove the following thesis : that there has been a gradation from the military's pure *de facto* sense of authority to its *de jure* sense in the Turkish Republic.

If we concern ourselves with something more than a description of a social institution, we cannot disregard the ideas, especially the legal and political ideas, as the raw material that helped to build it. For men respond, within the environment suitable for their existence in historic time, to changes in circumstances and movements of thought. This refers to the fact that there is a constant interplay between challenge and response in social,

¹ Paper originally presented at the British Society for Middle East Studies Annual Conference, University of Exeter, 12-15 July 1987.

and within it particularly political, development. Hence, in dealing with, say, political development one has to take account of abstract concepts. Indeed, in the present argument, I approach my subject philosophically in that I want to enhance its linguistic clarity. For I assume that language used to describe the "military's authority" will reflect conceptions of political reality.

Now, concerning political reality, it is not always recognized that we continue to repeat generalizations about what we think we observe which bear precious little relation to what we know for ourselves. What indeed we think we observe, relating to the concept of "authority", has mainly derived from the observations of Thomas Hobbes. It is true that Hobbes, that acute analyst of his unstable state and society, desired stability ; he wanted order. He was not the first to do so, nor was he likely to be the last thinker to comment upon the behaviour of men towards each other. What he did was to make assumptions about the nature of man's social, and especially political, instincts and then to deduce from them a fairly comprehensive theory about how the state had evolved and how it should be run. This *a priori* deduction was, as he put it in the penultimate page of *Leviathan*, "occasioned by the disorders of the present time"². Hence, in dealing with such circumstances, whether the *Leviathan* did reduce all to "the condition of those who live under the Turk, the Muscovit, Prester John : and the Magol", as the Master of Southampton Grammar School, Alexander Rosse³, was convinced it would, is a matter of view, not of fact. And with the exception of the "Muscovit" has the value of historical or mythical conjecture. It is my view that although to date the most impressive treatise on political man to satisfy the mind has turned out to be *Leviathan*, it still cannot digest the fact that political man is not and has never been the apotheosis of rationality it assumed he was. Put bluntly, *Leviathan* does not help me much to see the mediaeval state as Hobbes saw it then. What it does, however, is more useful than that. It supplies universal political concepts ; it enlarges and clarifies them as clear, consistent, coherent and helpful, as one would wish. "Authority" is one such concept, and a significant one at that, for it was introduced by Hobbes to grapple with the problems of analysing human institutions. The military is a human institution; hence its significance. But rather than be drawn into the complexities of institutional politics, perhaps I should quote here a passage from *Leviathan* : "So that by Authority, is always understood a Right of doing any act"⁴.

² T. Hobbes, *Leviathan* (ed. G.B. Macpherson). Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, p. 728

³ A. Rosse, *Leviathan drawn out with a book or animadversions upon Mr Hobbs his Leviathan*, Printed by Tho Newcomb, for Richard Royston at the Angel in Ivy-Lane, London, p. 23

⁴ T. Hobbes, *op. cit.*, p. 218

It is evident, to me at least, that Hobbes presupposes a set of rules according to which certain individuals, indeed institutions, are authorized to do certain things and not to do other things. Thus, an institution may legitimately make whatever decisions it deems necessary, an individual issue whatever commands he deems commensurate with his status ; they both, as *auctores* assume *auctoritas* - as the progenitors, producers and implementors of decisions or commands assume an imperative role in the political life of society. This is what is generally called the *de jure* sense of authority. And it makes sense from where Hobbes stood. From my standpoint, however, "authority" in its pure *de jure* sense could safely be used only if I were to give criteria for its application such that one can at least formally identify what Gramsci called "the first element ..." of politics," ... that there really do exist rulers and ruled, leaders and led"⁵. Yet when the emphasis on the concepts of political philosophy changes under the impact of political events, it comes to mean that the discussion is influenced by those very changes. Simply because previously accepted notions require modification so that they can serve an immediate purpose ; in other words, they adjust themselves to the changes, they reflect the difference in emphasis on the concepts of political philosophy. Thus, new political realities can bring about a still newer philosophical interest and, more significantly, a justifiable reaction against merely the formal identification of the elements of politics - a kind of reaction that will prompt how, in the first place, formal identification is conferred. This will require, for instance, a perspective beyond the concept of rule-conferred authority. It is possible then for a phenomenon to emerge that combines a *de jure* sense of authority with its primordality - in other words, its *de facto* sense. Only this sense of authority can do justice to its primary function - the clearest expression of which is found in Bertrand de Jouvenel : "Of man leading man on, of the ascendancy of a settled will which summons and orients uncertain wills ... Society in fact exists only because man is capable of proposing and of affecting by his proposals another's dispositions ... What I mean by 'authority' is the ability of a man to get his own proposals accepted."⁶.

Authority in a *de facto* sense in fact has always existed since man began inducing other men to do what he told them, convincing them that they ought, regardless of the reason for so doing. Thus, de Jouvenel's original insistence that *de facto* authority is essential to the forward march of

⁵ A. Gramsci, *Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (ed. & trans. Q. Hoare & G. Nowell Smith. Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971, p. 144

⁶ B. de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty : an inquiry into the political good* (trans. J.F. Huntington University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957, pp. 30-31)

every society and indeed to the very existence of society vivifies the idea that political order is an essential condition of free political society. The characterization of this idea has a certain circular quality in establishing the landmarks between freedom and authority. And in a passage of the "Introduction" to *The right to heresy* we find Stefan Zweig doing just this : "In the absence of authority, liberty degenerates into licence, and chaos ensues ; and authority becomes tyranny unless it be tempered by freedom"⁷.

All this is preliminary to my central argument. The present exposition on the two facets of authority are almost overfamiliar to contemporary political philosophers⁸. The inescapable conclusion of their argument is that the notion of authority forms a philosophical compound. Peter s' comment on this is : "The *de jure* sense of 'authority' proclaims that a man has a right to be an *auctor* ; the *de facto* sense states that he is a matter of fact one"⁹.

The crux, then, of Peters' position is his contention that the concept of "authority" can be used in a *de jure* and a *de facto* sense. And the central task to which political philosophers like himself have addressed themselves is that of the nature of *de facto* authority most commonly arising from *de jure* authority. Moreover, that Peters is clearly both justifying the direction and affirming the validity of this type of justification cannot be doubted in the right of the passage which follows : "These is a gradation from the pure *de jure* sense of 'authority' ... to the *de facto* sense"¹⁰.

It is the universality of this contention that I wish to deny. Indeed, in this essay I am concerned, by the analysis of a representative example, to propound an entirely opposite thesis about this gradation. In so doing, it is not that I wish to return to the concept of authority of the Romans ; it is rather that I do not wish to see the perception of this concept as Latin-culture-bound, leading to a blindness to the importance of its inclusion by, say, the Ottomans - whose precise nomenclature *sulta* (*de facto* authority) and *salâhiyet* (*de jure* authority) passed into the Turkish of Turkey with equal precision as the modern *yetke* and *yetki* respectively. Authority, in fact,

⁷ S. Zweig, *Erasmus and The right to heresy* (trans. E & C. Paul). Souvenir Press, London, 1979, p. 177).

⁸ See esp. R. S. Peters, Symposium : authority, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supp. Vol.32, 1958, pp. 207-224 & S. I. Benn, Authority, in *The encyclopedia of philosophy*, The Free Press, New York, vol. 1, 1967, pp. 215-218.1967)

⁹ R. S. Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

¹⁰ R. S. Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 212

is a recurrent social concept which does break free from institutional ethnocentrism.

Nor am I faced here with a concept in the form of a novel substance. I am not. In this context the idea of authority, albeit inherent in the military, has a concrete life of its own and a definite social function in the historical process. It can be realized when that process attains to a given historical situation. Thus it retains relevance to reality.

However, it is probably evident from these somewhat bold claims and statements that the immediate questions "Under what conditions has there been a gradation from the military's pure *de facto* sense of authority to its *de jure* sense in the Turkish Republic ?" and "Why, in any case, has there been such a gradation ?" do not need to involve the prime considerations of all other Turkish states in Anatolia and elsewhere, including the Ottoman Empire. In what then does the problem consist ? And to which stage of Turkish history can the delineation of the problem be thus attained ?

These are all questions about whose answers it is easy to be mistaken unless I pay sufficient attention to the significance of events following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire : one aim of what follows will be to present the military aspects which must be emphasized before we can settle such questions.

II

The military, political and economic collapse of the Ottoman Empire as the direct consequence of defeat in the Great War (*Harb-i Umumi*) loosed forces of change which altered the locus of power in society and attitudes toward social order upon which the governmental arrangement had hitherto depended for its stability. With a reality so conceived, in its outward manifestations and its final effects the Ottoman dissolution would no doubt seem to have been primarily a military event. No doubt it was so, in that it had military repercussions, significantly, in the forcible divorcing of the Ottoman military from its accepted role as the ultimate arbiter of political activity.

Here, it would not be irrelevant to mention that this type of arbitrament comprised the political ruling group role, in the form of holding the political initiative, which had been created by the officer corps of the

"Young Turk" era. Once created, it had become acceptable to the civilians and, more importantly, to the soldiers themselves. And indeed soldiers were compelled to believe that their conduct conformed to that role. The military profession saw itself as an expression of Ottoman society. To the officer of the *Meşrutiyet* (Constitutional Government), the military was not only seen as an agent of the Ottoman State but considered itself to be sacrosanct, possessively watching over its inherited political power, prerogatives and privileges and maintaining a distinct political identity its own. Then, as with the officers, so it was with the military institution which cemented the corps of officers together in such a way that it achieved a sort of separate personality. Thus, the political identity of such a distinguished personality expressed itself in the various forms of its conscious political acts, the most distinguishable of which, at the risk of repetition, was the military's playing of the political ruling group role.

It is, of course, this primordial political compulsion which pointed the way to an understanding of the dominant behaviour of the officers. Accordingly, whenever individual organizations or autonomous groups tried to assume, or succeeded in assuming, political power with the purpose of emancipating the Ottoman state from the predominance of the officer corps, the officers reasserted their predominance. Equally, when the defeat and the subsequent occupation of her remaining key territories placed the Ottomans' major institutions under *Entente* control, the officer corps perceived the foreign presence as the prime cause of the eradication of their predominance. They immediately commenced to identify themselves with the destiny of the Turkish nation which they were convinced of their vocation to save, a vocation sanctioned by their uniform.

I argue, therefore, that just as it was in times of domestic turmoil and continuing menace during the Second Constitutional Period, in the face of the post-War victors' duplicity and subsequent invasion the military was the primary and directing influence in organizing a nucleus for the reestablishment of order in the chaos.

In essence, starting from the middle of November 1918, the *Entente* commanders overturned the superstructure which past history had promoted. More especially, they, the alien soldiers, subverted the belief in the omnipotence of their native counterparts, lately under the aegis of Deputy Commander-in-Chief (*Başkumandan Vekili*) Lieutenant-General Enver Paşa; to use the oft-used metaphor of those times, the *zimam-i idare* (reins of

government)¹¹ passed from the hands of Enver Paşa into those of, say, General Sir G.F. Milne, "Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea and Allied Forces in Asia Minor" - to name but one of the top *Entente* commanders who were empowered to interpret and to enforce the terms of the Mondros (Mudros) Armistice of 30 October toward the total dismemberment of the Empire (or rather, what remained of it) by collusion or by coercion, by occupation or by invasion, directly or by proxy.

Now, while there can be no question but that this proliferation of conflict was vitally significant for the future, for the time being, more significantly, the victors had as a result simply substituted one political ruling group role for another : more uncompromising in its conception, less binding in its moral claim, in many ways as authoritarian in its character and, to a marked degree, maintained by malevolent will and dissimilar force. This kind of conclusion the historians have all too seldom brought to our attention.

Yet it is a valid conclusion, so it will be said. But this is not enough. What matters more for us is that the first, formal, occupation of Istanbul (13 November 1918) by armada was the last critical stage in the dismemberment of the Empire. The Allies, in breaking down the social continuity, had certainly effected an inherent and indeed potential antagonism in the society. Then, this meant only one thing : that an insulating gap had opened between the superstructure (military) and the basis (society) so that the society, under the prevailing influence of its dominant constituent, the living Turkish military tradition, could not consciously allow the military to atrophy, to lapse into desuetude. Nor would the officers, with a heightened consciousness of their past and a clearer insight into economical, political and psychological motives set in motion long ago and which still controlled them, let themselves be dislodged from the position they had occupied in the social order. From the beginning of 1919, at first sight, these two impetuses could be observed operating intimately in such a way that neither might be regarded as predominant. And neither of them could escape the immediate decision that then confronted both soldier and will, one way or another : namely, whether he would devote his resources to regaining the position he had once held or would yield to the then almost all-pervading alien forces he himself had unwittingly kindled. The first choice entailed a fight to the finish for, of course, armed aggression required armed resistance - a violent reaction for which no other conceivable force in the Ottoman realm but the regular military could provide effective initiative and, indeed, execution.

¹¹ A. F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Yayinlari, Ankara, 1955, p. 111.

What, however, this involved fundamentally was the transferal, yet again, of the *zimam-i idare* from the hands of their current holders, the Allies, back to those of that disciplined force which always had and now, in fact, would once more provide the effective initiative ; this could only be the military. And only in this way, certain in the belief of their own indispensability in the life of the nation, could the officers develop their own social capacity to the full, making sure that their voice was heard in the discussion of what they considered to be the problem of "national liberation". They had been moulded by the elements of lost wars, *Balkan*, *Trablusgarb* and *Harb-i Umumi* alike, and acted by experience or by conviction or both, on the basis of the belief that the rights of a nation are fought for, not granted. "Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words", wrote Hobbes the philosopher¹². "Poor Wilson, he didn't understand that frontiers which bayonets ... could not defend cannot be defended by any other principle", said Atatürk the soldier¹³. He and his fellow officers mostly believed this postulate to be central to the conduct, more precisely to the perception, of national liberation. For national liberation to succeed, therefore, the military had to be indivisibly loyal to it. And to be loyal it had to be resolute. From the perspective of the officers, then, the very outcome and, more importantly, the aftermath of the "liberation" depended upon the military acting as the ultimate arbiter. Its quality was attributed to both men and materiel, but first and foremost to men - reliance upon whom forms the fundamental tenet of Turkish military thinking.

If this is how we should discern the gist of the *Istiklâl Harbi* (War of Independence), as the Turks came to call it, the Turkish military tradition that keeps on reflecting the predominance of the Turkish military seems fully ascertained. Because there was a good reason then for officers to be cast in the same ideological outlook, namely, Anatolian-Turkish nationalism ; still, there was more vigorous growth of independent initiative and conscious attempts to make those hanging back condone and then conform to it. The two notions of "national liberation" and "armed resistance" were an exclusive and sublime prerogative assigned to the military. In his valedictory message delivered, in writing, to the "Armies of the Western Front", "Major-General Ismet" Paşa expressed them thus : "...the Armies of the Western Front are the great achievement of our nation. The salvation of our motherland until now has been assured by them. But in future, the securing of existence of the motherland will truly be dependent on them. The High Command of the Armies of the Western Front which has adopted this subtle

¹² T. Hobbes, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

¹³ F. R. Atay, *Atatürk'un bana anlattıkları*, Sel Yayınları, İstanbul, 1955, pp. 61-62)

point as the guide for conduct constitutes the foundation of our motherland"¹⁴.

When the two notions of "national liberation" and "armed resistance" had been recognized and defined as something inherent in the military's nature, their action was to establish their *de facto* authority by causing the soldiers' voice to be heard above the will and settled custom of the civilians. By that hypothesis, what were then generally called "nationalist officers", as opposed to their former "imperial" selves, saw their life as being spent in the service of the "nation", combining a nation-state concept : it was to the "nation" that the military was fundamentally responsible. And the responsibility of decision-making had to be borne on the nation's behalf, in spite of the existing state under nominally independent but effectively puppet, imperial "Armistice (Istanbul) Governments". It seems to have been mainly for such reasons that the military gained ascendancy. And the chief stimulus for such ascendancy, the motive of national interest merged with corporate interest, had been effected willingly, sometimes unwittingly and even hopelessly. In any connection, nationalism was a simple, given fact - the starting point of patriotic political action, not the end result of unconscious policy. What followed was that the military endeavoured to support its *de facto* authority by the principle of nationalism. This, I maintain, is the root from which the military's freedom of political action was developed and deliberately confined to the sphere of armed force in order that it might challenge the Allied forces' supremacy in the realm.

III

The process by which the implementation of challenge to the victors of the Great War had been attempted by the vanquished Turks comprises the problem of the Turkish War of Independence. And three-and-a-half years were spent in disentangling it.

Enver Paşa, with the message that "on account of the separate armistice, the form which my motherland will now be taking is a clear sign that I will not be able to be of use in the near future in these lands"¹⁵, had left. All the same, there still remained a sufficient number of candidates belonging to the same *ittihatçı* (Unionist) generation, who could fill his position. Notwithstanding the objective differences, differences of principle

¹⁴ *Harp Tarihi Vesikalari Dergisi*, Sa.58, Aralık, Vesika N° 1339, 1966.

¹⁵ C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdim : milli mücadeleye gidiş*, Baha Matbaası, İstanbul, 1965, Cilt I p. 126.

in the mode in which the approaching political revolution was conceived and, no less, differences of personalities, they all seem to have had a common purpose : to grasp the *zimam-i idare* at all costs. When the opposite side would not let them go, it became imperative to obtain them by coercion, not through conciliation. With the rise of coercion in *Anadolu* (Anatolia) the claim to legitimacy of Istanbul waned, and the ground abandoned by the Imperialists was reclaimed by the Nationalists. In the mean duration of the armed resistance, this "progress" imposed increasing sacrifices on the people on behalf of those "candidates" who could make their aspirations come true and from whose liberation it derived a mutual benefit. The realization of this "progress", therefore, was the convergence of interest of those so-called *Osmanlı Paşas* and the people. Neither side wanted to live under alien occupation, neither had the disinterested motive nor could one succeed without the help of the other. This convergence of interests, in my opinion, reached its summit on 5 August 1921 - the day the *Büyük Millet Meclisi* (Grand National Assembly) voted unanimously for its *Reis* (President), former Ottoman Brigadier-General Mustafa Kemal Paşa, to become the *Başkumandan* (Commander-in-Chief) so that : "Regarding the augmentation of the moral and material strength of the armed forces to its maximum and still more the consolidation of their leadership and administration, [he] is authorized, in the name of the Assembly, in act, to make use of the powers of the Grand National Assembly concerning these [matters]."¹⁶.

"According to this article, the orders I would give would be law" : this is how Mustafa Kemal Paşa put it¹⁷. And in fact they were law and had the force of law. They extended from the calling into requisition of one apiece of underclothing, pair of socks and *çariks* (rawhide sandals) from every dwelling in the "motherland" ("...vatanda") to the setting up of *Istiklâl Mahkemeleri* (Independence Tribunals), initially in the districts of Kastamonu, Samsun, Konya, Eskişehir and Ankara. Mustafa Kemal Paşa had now achieved a degree of power never possessed by Enver Paşa. The very existence of this power, almost Weberian *Macht*, in actual fact meant in no uncertain sense that power was power over "others" - friend and foe alike. It was identifiable with all the force and authority that the Ankara Government could muster. Power was, then, interpreted exclusively as the only effective, available means for getting what the "Nationalists" wanted by preventing the "Allies" from getting what they wanted, because the motive of domination had become a reigning force in *Anadolu*. The appointment, by

¹⁶ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *Zabit Ceridesi*, Cilt 12, I.Devre, 62. İctima, 5.8.1337, 3.Celse, p. 18.

¹⁷ M. K. Atatürk, *Nutuk*, Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, İstanbul, 1950-59, Cilt 2 p. 613.

intensifying antagonisms and passions, had produced new combinations in politics and a newer horizon : the momentum of the *zimam-i idare* passed from the hands of the Allied commanders back into those of, this time, Mustafa Kemal Paşa. In early October 1921, in a "Memorandum by the (British) Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs", "... one thing seem(ed) clear ... namely that, in spite of some hostile symptoms, the national movement, with Mustapha Kemal either as dictator or figurehead ha(d) a real hold on Asia Minor"¹⁸. It was a hold which "Müşir Gazi (Field Marshal) Mustafa Kemal Paşa" (as he became after the Battle of Sakarya, 23 August-13 September 1921) would not willingly loosen after it had received a military, political and indeed popular sanctification. Even those bewildered intellectuals who, three years earlier, had looked forward to a mandate from the United States as a judicious expedient and last resort, now adopted revolution. Only now did the "civilian" intellectuals become much aware of the military's explicit doctrine of "total war" as the effective vehicle for the right of armed resistance for liberation and thus for the necessity of participation by the masses. The blending of these sanguinary sentiments with revolution was a novelty. It served to increase resistance and lent credence to the conviction that an absolutist conception of warfare would best be adopted by the most "authoritarian" personality.

Here, I need not speak at length about the inception and the conduct of the "War of Independence" at its various theatres (*Anadolu Muharebeleri*), nor is it necessary for the present purpose to assess the part played in it by the ideas and acts which were perpetuated to vindicate yet another war to the war-weary and profoundly depressed civil population, or by the person of Mustafa Kemal Paşa. The country which in 1918 seemed to be dying, if not already dead, first defied the victors of the Great War and then won almost everything it demanded at the Lausanne Conference table in 1923.

All in all, one point, however, cannot be emphasized enough : Turkish success was due to sheer warfare, for the strategic element, the factor of the military, must be treated as an organic part of the whole episode including that of the diplomatic manoeuvring. To put it precisely, if it had not been for the "nationalist officers" there would have been no Turkish "nation-state". This proposition may easily be misleading unless a corollary of it is brought into account. The factor of the military did not blindly interrupt the life of the society from outside ; it only reacted when its grip on

¹⁸ Public record office, F.O. 371/6533, Memorandum from Lord Curzon, Londres, 7 October 1921.

the society had been interrupted by the alien militaries. The process of the former succeeding the latter impinged upon an irreducible chain of known effects and circumstances which culminated in the establishment of a nation-state by the former. While the military acted as the commander of the revolution, it remained throughout itself under the command of Mustafa Kemal Paşa. He alone provided what Berkes calls the "nucleus of leadership" as the "factor of great importance"¹⁹ toward the birth of a revolutionary political regime, the Republic (29 October 1923).

I lay stress on the direction of such development in which explanation merely expresses the general historical *raison d'être* of what I term the principle of military preoccupation - that the military institution, already well-fitted for occupying a given political zone as its sole defender, will keep any other political forms from asserting themselves in the new political society, even assuming that the competitors are capable of evolving. All the more so, for political cultures are not immutable, but changes in the values and fundamental political beliefs which are among their components do not keep pace with every policy innovation. The Republic was one such innovation.

Historically, career experiences and military indoctrination at all levels of the Ottoman Imperial forces since about 1900 had resulted in much broader perspectives than had been the tradition. Though the consequences may be open to some dispute, it is possible to detect certain definitive effects of these. It may well have been that, in general, these experiences had the effect of making the officer corps more critical of, and more negative toward, civilians - politicians and bureaucrats alike. In particular, however, prevailing patterns of belief in the military were those of official "Ottoman" nationalism surviving as a sort of outer-coating to conceal what was plainly Turkish nationalism beneath, constitutionalism in the sense that the officers were the "Guardians of the Constitution" ("*Nigâhban-i Meşrutiyet*") and, under Enver Paşa, overt disciplinarianism.

"Guardians of the Constitution" was the most recognizable symbol of the "Young Turks" regime - a symbol which served to ritualize the political process to the extent of crystallization. The political indoctrination, therefore, was designed to condition the officer corps through developing such forms as the result of thinking of themselves as the "Guardians of the Constitution". From this standpoint, what was at issue after the establishment

¹⁹ N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, McGill University Press, Montreal, 1964, p. 435)

of a nation-state out of an empire was the most important shift in the conception of drastic political change which would once again weld the officer corps into ideological unity. Just as there was a coalition of the regular military with the other social groups, such as "partisans"²⁰, at the institutional level/during the "War of Independence", so the progenitors of the nation-state too placed much emphasis on the unanimity of "Turkish nationalist" sentiments within the reascent officer corps and the selected newcomers ; they also made sure that the nationalist enthusiasm of the civilian activists fused with that of the soldiers. Thus the affinity between the basic modes of thought and the mode of military organization constituted the military's intrinsic politicization - the historical acquisition and expression of political values generated by the military's own tradition. Moreover, the two patterns of extrinsic politicization - the inculcation of extra-military values by the civilians for their own ends - namely, recruitment, promotion, discharge, first, indoctrination and education, second, attuned the military to the most fundamental preoccupations of the revolutionary culture.

IV

Although in all too summary fashion, the foregoing argument is indispensable if we are to see the gradation from the military's pure *de facto* sense of authority to its *de jure* sense in these terms : the Imperial Ottoman military acting in the political ruling group role under the direction of Mustafa Kemal Paşa, in fact initially exercised the *de facto* authority through its ability to dispose of overwhelming power. Soldiers regarded soldiers as entitled to command civilians, civilians thought that soldiers were the best equipped to make crucial decisions, and both worked hard to bring about unquestioning conformity. The military was then believed, followed and thus regarded, if only in an embryonic sense, as having the right to be obeyed. What was the necessary element in this relationship was the military's credibility. Yet it was not, of course, sufficient ; moral acceptability was required as well. Who required it ? Soldiers themselves. And it is the soldiers who provided it through their tradition and nationalistic justification. Then, in general, the military's *de facto* authority reasserted the military in authority - hence acting in its political ruling group role, without having recourse to naked power as the civilian conformity was ensured.

²⁰ For the best exposition in English, see M. Yama'uchi, "Reflections on the social movements during the National Liberation War of Turkey : a tentative analysis of partisan activities in Western Anatolia", *Ajia Afurika Gengo Bunka Kenkyū*/Journal of Asian and African Studies, N° 15, 1978, pp. 15-50.

No sooner had the military transformed itself into acting the pressure group role - as the lowest possible form of its conscious political acts, than it actually began to negate the parasitism, if you like, of its *de facto* authority. Then, it could only exert influence on governmental institutions for its own advantage. The transformation was carried out from above, but with mutual consent, and in parallel with the reduction of the "actors", retaining only the most reliable members of the institution and recruiting new members from the nation. The emergent officer corps appeared as a completely homogeneous and disciplined force. It was metamorphosed from a purely "gun-barrel elite" into a sacrosanct elite - seemingly subordinated to civilian power but providing the actual power base, thus retaining, nay, jealously watching its latent autonomy of action from the commanding heights. It is, however, supremely significant that the military at once opted for a political label which, of all the contemporary views, was closest to it ; all the more so, for this was the most commensurate with the perception of the macrocosm of the state - in fact, a republic.

This is the point from which the gradation of the military's pure *de facto* sense of authority to its *de jure* sense emanates. It has done so with the inclusion of the concept "Republic", and its corrolary, the "Armed Forces of the Republic" ("*Cumhuriyet Ordulari*") - used for the first time on 15 February 1924 by the President of that Republic himself, significantly in a speech made to the Military High Command²¹ - clearly established the officer as the defender also of the concept of the "Turkish homeland" ("*Türk yurdu*"). Above all, these two concepts were embraced by that of duty throughout the officers' careers. Here, the decisive point is that the officers thereafter became honour - and even duty-bound to adhere to the regime ; and the military, established on the lines of the "Armed Forces of the Regime", thus made the officers the "Guardians of the Republic" ("*Nigâhban-i Cumhuriyet*"), as they might be labelled, or, better still, "Watchmen of the Republic" ("*Cumhuriyetin Bekçisi*"), as they are labelled nowadays.

Here, I argue that such was, above all, the legitimation of the military's *de facto* authority - the *de jure* authority which was enshrined in the soldiers' "Oath of Service" laid down in the "Armed Forces Internal Service Law" ("*Ordu Dahilî Hizmet Kanunu*") n° 2771 of 10 June 1935. The law clearly proclaimed that the military had a right to be a recognized *auctor*. Because it required each soldier, in Article 35, to "... take the oath on

²¹ M. K. Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün söylev ve demeçleri* (toplayan N. Arsan), Türk İnkilâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara, 1959, Cilt II p. 167.

my honour that I will, in peace, in war, on land, at sea and in the air, always and everywhere serve my nation and my Republic unswervingly and devotedly and obey the laws and regulations and my superiors ..."²². This was his vocation, a sense of which was evident in the first clause of Article 34 of the Law : "The duty of the military is to look after and protect the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic (... *Türk yurdunu ... Türk Cumhuriyetini kollamak ve korumaktır*) determined in the Constitution"²³. This indeed was the presupposition of a rule which determined that the military may legitimately take certain types of decision ; for example, it can decide to intervene or pronounce threats of intervention, in short, assert its place in politics when soldiers deem it necessary "... to look after and protect" "the homeland" or "the Turkish Republic" or both - the objects with which they wholly identify themselves. In other words, Article 34, for the first time, explicitly, in the Republic's life, provided the criterion, by which the notion of the military's will, supremely capable of political deliberations and decisions, presupposed the notion of authority and then legitimated it - made it lawful ; made it thus the military's sole business "to look after and protect", significantly, "the Republic". Consequently, "military intervention in domestic politics" can under no circumstance imply that such a decision is, in fact, accepted or that related commands are obeyed simply because they issue from the military whose past sacrifices are regarded as bestowing sufficient legitimacy. What it does imply is that the grounds for such legitimacy are based on the law jointly accepted by rulers and ruled alike, in letter and in spirit. The military's *de jure* authority negated the parasitism of its pure *de facto* authority. Furthermore, it enabled the military to reduce its role voluntarily to the pressure group level, while keeping open its political option of acting at any level. For it is idle to expect the abstract possibility of the conversion of an interventionist military into a "neutral" one when there are known economical, political, psychological causes so much more active in its nature, always interplaying and interfering and thus preventing the actual accomplishment of such conversion. Hence the principle of military preoccupation which is, as I have tried to show, further facilitated by its legitimacy.

But legitimacy opens up a still larger subject, to which one would have to allocate a separate study. However, it would be a mistake that one might make in conclusion to suppose that because the essence of my argument has been an attack on the generalizations of others, nothing definite follows. I

²² F. (hazırlayan) Çoker, *Askerî kanun ve nizamlarımız*, [T. C. M. M. V. Dz. Kuv. Kumd.] Deniz Basımevi, İstanbul, 1959, Cilt II p. 5.

²³ *Ibid.*

have followed through the attack on the gradation from the pure *de jure* sense of authority to the *de facto* sense and, by the analysis of a representative example, tried to show that the transition was politically valid once the order of senses (and their purity) was changed. I have thus tried questioning the validity of Peters' philosophical exposition to get the matter falsified. It is, of course, open to dispute still to claim that mine is a special type of case which we only recognize as pertaining to the Turkish Republic and which we only characterize by assigning the two senses of authority to the military, because it can be and was a matter of political history transformed into a matter of political philosophy - that may not necessarily fit a political pattern. But this, true though it may turn out to be, does not affect any of my preceding arguments ; hence it is not significant. But, for the present, it is supremely important to recognize that what the gradation from the military's pure *de facto* authority to its *de jure* sense achieved was vital : it provided a justifiable depository capable of storing the frequently - summoned legitimacy for the military's preoccupation in the society, and in particular in the politics of that society.

V

But there remains the question : while "duty"-bound "to look after and protect ... the Turkish Republic", how can the "Turkish Armed Forces" remain out of "politics" as they always claim they do ; or even, as their civilian apologists, still trapped in their own historical contradictions, do ? After all, politics in the highest sense is to most of us precisely what it was to Oswald Spengler, "life, and life is politics. Every man is willy-nilly a member of this battle-drama" ; as, too, logically, every military man would be. And wouldn't it be illogical to think of a military, any military, as being outside politics ? For every member of this political battle-drama is swayed by loyalty - to my mind indisputably the key concept in the political aspects of civil-military relations of which the object identifies the characteristic bent of a military. And whatever the object, from a monarchy to a republic, on a broad constitutional basis, as long as a military pledges loyalty, remains loyal and, most important of all, feels loyal, it cannot even begin to be said to be outside politics. Simply because identification with the object, that is, the manner of government, is in itself a political formula which is given a partisan colouring by virtue of the nature of that regime.

There are militaries, however, and no doubt there have been, which remain out of day-to-day politics - the policy-making activity itself. Thus they do not become obsessed with the effort and hurry of politics. To this extent therefore they consent in politics, in the higher sense. This obviously

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exposes yet another problem : that tacit military support for rulers in whatever kind of regime, in whatever capacity, has never been perceived in the civil-military relations literature in general, as political involvement ; opposition by the military has, in contrast, always been construed as active participation in politics. But even passive support for an institution by those who have sufficient power to oppose it is, in reality, involvement in politics. And the Ottoman past has many tales to tell of - were space available and the occasion suitable to tell of them here.